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RAFAEL GELY*

A Tale of Three Statutes... (and
One Industry): A Case Study on
the Competitive Effects
of Regulation

O

ne of the most significant contributions of the law and economics literature has been the analysis of legislative acts as
rent-seeking activity, with corresponding winners and losers.1 A
major insight from this literature relates to our understanding of
the competitive effects of regulation. Regulatory activity, by
Congress, the executive, and even the judiciary, affects markets
in non-trivial ways. Some examples are fairly obvious, as when
Congress enacts a tariff on imported goods,2 or when Congress
subsidizes farm products. 3 In a case of tariffs on imports, Congress is guarding domestic producers against foreign competition.4 In the case of subsidies, Congress is reducing the costs of
production of a particular sector of the economy and shifting
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. Part of the research for this article
was conducted as part of a joint research project between the Institute for Law and
the Workplace at Chicago-Kent College of Law, and the W.J. Usery Center for the
Workplace at Georgia State University. Professor Gely acknowledges the contributions of Hank Perritt, Harold Krent and Martin Malin.
I See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991) (reviewing the history of the economic theory of regulation); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983) (describing the legislative process as a system in which "actual political choices are determined by the efforts of
individuals and groups to further their own interests").
2 See Stephen P. Magee, Endogenous Protection: The Empirical Evidence, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE:

A

HANDBOOK

526, 526-27 (Dennis G. Mueller

ed., 1997) (describing a tariff as the result of the political bargaining among interest
groups).
3 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:
The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83, 105-118 (1989) (analyzing
the dairy industry from the public choice perspective).
4 See Magee, supra note 2, at 527.
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those costs to a different sector.5
A voluminous literature has developed applying these economic insights.6 Rarely, however, have the effects of regulation
on members of the same industries been studied. This gap is understandable. First, it will be difficult for Congress to single out a
firm within an industry for special treatment in any legislative
act. Principles of evenhanded governance require that similar
firms operate within the same regulatory environment. Differential regulation presents the flip side of subsidies. Those whom
the government regulates the least may stand a better shot in the
marketplace. Less efficient firms may benefit. Second, and perhaps more importantly, industry interests tend to be homogeneous, so that a regulatory framework that helps (or hurts) one
member has the same effect on all the firms within the industry.7
The express package delivery industry (express industry)
presents us with a unique research opportunity.8 Probably due to
historical happenstance, individual firms in the express industry
operate under different regulatory regimes in the area of labor
law. Congress has regulated the largest, the Postal Service, under
the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA);9 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has asserted jurisdiction over the next largest, United Parcel Service (UPS), and a number of others under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA);' ° and then Federal
Express and several others are regulated instead under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).' Indeed, airline employees of UPS and
Airborne Express are regulated under the RLA even though
most of the companies' other employees fall under the NLRA.
The application of the three different labor relations regulatory regimes to the firms in the express delivery industry has important implications regarding the ability of these firms to
compete in the delivery of their services. The three regulatory
5 See Miller, supra note 3, at 130.
6 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 21-31.
7 See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS

AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (1965) (describing the formation of interest
groups).
8 The express package industry refers to firms competing in the package delivery
service such as the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), United Parcel Service (UPS), Federal Express, DHL, Airborne Express, Emery Worldwide, and Purolator. See infra
notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
9 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1994).
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-187 (1994).
1145 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1994).
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regimes impose differential costs upon the firms, potentially
skewing market competition. Employees' right to strike, the
scope of collective bargaining, and the prospects of costly litigation differ across the industry. Firms operating under one regime
consequently may gain a competitive advantage over another.
For example, some companies within an industry might be advantaged because their ground employees may only organize on
a system-wide basis when other companies are vulnerable to being organized on a piece-by-piece basis.' 2 In virtually all other
industries, application of labor laws to a particular firm has no
competitive impact because the same regulatory structure governs all firms within the industry.
By analyzing the cost implications of the three labor law regimes, this Article seeks to contribute to our understanding of
the economic effects of regulation. Part I briefly addresses the
structure of the express industry to demonstrate the similarity of
services provided by the firms. 3
Part II sketches the contrasting labor-relations regimes that
govern the industry. 4 The regulatory differences stem from historical and conceptual premises governing labor relations in the
trucking and airline industries that no longer are relevant in today's integrated market. Yet, fundamental aspects of each regulatory regime differ. The right to strike, for instance, constitutes
a more central tenet of the NLRA than the RLA, and the right is
not protected at all under the PRA. On the other hand, an employer's duty to bargain is far more limited under the NLRA and
PRA than under the RLA.
Part III assesses the comparative costs imposed by the different labor relations regimes. 1 5 The cost implications of strikes
loom as one major distinction. Costs arising due to an expanded
bargaining obligation form another. The incidence of litigation
also varies, as does the cost of administering labor relations
under the three regimes.
Part IV discusses the implications of this analysis.1 6 Two major
implications are developed in this section. The first implication is
7
with regard to the regulation of the express delivery industry.1
12 See
13 See
14 See
15 See
16 See
17 See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

93-98 and accompanying text.
21-35 and accompanying text.
36-188 and accompanying text.
189-307 and accompanying text.
308-42 and accompanying text.
308-14 and accompanying text.
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In the United States, labor relations legislation is a sensitive issue
to address from a political standpoint. 8 Although the President
and Congress have frequently been willing to intervene on an ad
hoc basis in "emergency strikes," neither of these political
branches of government has shown any readiness to undertake
fundamental reform of the basic regulatory frameworks through
permanent legislation. The probability of moving part or all of
the express package industry out from under either of the major
private-sector statutes into the framework of the PRA-designed
for a public sector entity-is low. Moreover, the likelihood that
Congress will create a new labor relations structure solely for the
express industry is minimal. Due to the substantially different
costs imposed by the labor relations regimes, however, the government may be persuaded to equalize regulatory burdens. Only
by leveling the playing field can the government pave the way for
an efficient express package delivery market.
The second implication is broader and it relates to the regulatory process that has dominated our experience in the administrative agency era.19 The basic approach to regulation in the
United States has been to adopt one regulatory framework and
apply it to a particular problem regardless of the myriad of circumstances experienced by the regulated subjects. This one-sizefits-all approach is clearly a dominant feature of our regulatory
framework. The comparison of the three labor regulatory regimes raises an interesting counterexample to the traditional
model of regulation. Instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all
model, could a regulatory model be conceptualized where a
menu of regulatory options is made available to the target population? Under such an approach those affected by the regulatory
regime will choose among the various regulatory options and
adopt those that better fit their particular situations. Part IV.B
develops the basic parameters of this proposal.2" The Article
ends with a brief conclusion.

18 See Leonard Bierman, Towards a New Model for Union Organizing: The
Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 28 B.C. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1985) (discussing the
failed attempts to reform labor law in the 1970s).
19 See infra notes 315-42 and accompanying text.
20 Id.
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I
THE EXPRESS INDUSTRY

The express industry encompasses the delivery of time sensitive parcels.21 There are seven national firms in the industry: the
United States Postal Service (USPS), 2 2 United Parcel Service
(UPS),23 Federal Express,2 4 Airborne Express,2 5 Purolator,26
DHL2 7 and Emery Worldwide.28 The express industry has
evolved over the course of the last three decades from primarily
surface transportation systems to integrated air and ground networks. The proportion of air to ground transportation and parcel
and document delivery varies among the firms, but the transportation mode utilized is secondary to the certainty of delivery.
The firms' principal focus on express package delivery justifies
analyzing the firms as a group. The basic service provided by
these firms is very similar in that all involve a combination of air
and ground transportation.2 9
The major difference between the firms in the industry is the
proportion of air to ground transportation upon which each rely.
UPS, for example, relies primarily on ground transportation.30
Distinctively, Emery Worldwide appears to be structured in a
more balanced manner regarding the proportion of air to ground
21 See, e.g., In re UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995).
22 See http://www.usps.gov (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).
23 See http://www.ups.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company
information).
24 See http://www.fedex.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).
25 See http://www.airborne.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general
company information).
26 See http://www.purolator.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general
company information).
27 See http://www.dhl-usa.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).
28 See http://emeryworldwide.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general
company information).
29 See, e.g., UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the
various delivery components of UPS's operations); In re Emery Worldwide Airlines,
28 N.M.B. 355, 357 (2001) (describing the operations of Emery Worldwide); In re
UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995) (describing the mix of ground and air operations of
UPS); In re Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. 32, 36-47 (1995) (describing the operations of Federal Express); In re DHL Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 17 (1982) (describing the
operations of DHL).
30 UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. at 778 (ninety-two percent of the packages processed by
UPS travel exclusively by ground).
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transportation. 3 ' Federal Express, on the other hand, has relied
on air transportation as its main operational approach.32
Although firms in the express industry vary in terms of the
proportion of air to ground transport, 33 they all provide the same
critical function of express package delivery.34 Participating
firms view themselves as part of a distinct industry, and an entire
literature has been spawned monitoring the vicissitude of express
package delivery.
II
CONTRASTING THE DIFFERENT REGULATORY REGIMES

Three major statutes govern the industry: the NLRA,3 6 the
RLA,3 7 and the PRA.38 These statutes share many common
characteristics, but fundamental differences exist in the protection afforded employees' rights to organize, in the scope of collective bargaining, and in their dispute resolution systems. 39 This

Section compares the three labor law regimes across these various dimensions.
A.

A Brief Introduction to the Historical Origins of the RLA,
NLRA and PRA

The three labor relations statutes applicable to the express delivery industry were enacted at very different time periods. Not
surprisingly, they adopt markedly different philosophies regarding the regulation of the labor process.
31 In re Emery Worldwide Airlines, 28 N.M.B. 216, 236 (2001).
32 Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 36-47.
33 Firms with a larger proportion of air to ground transport have been regulated
under the RLA as opposed to the NLRA. See, e.g., UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221
(D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Fed. Express Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 871 (1997).
34 See Lorraine M. Cote & William M. Takis, The Future of the U.S. Postal Service:
An Assessment of Options, in MANAGING CHANGE IN THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY
INDUSTRIES 342, 342-43 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1997)
(describing the competitive forces faced by the USPS).
35 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, EMERGING COMPETITION IN POSTAL AND DELIVERY SERVICES (1996). Transportationand Distribution,
an industry magazine, commonly features articles about industry developments affecting UPS, Federal Express, and other similar carriers.
3629 U.S.C. §§ 157-187 (1994).
37 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1994).
38 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1994).
39 Because the PRA resembles the NLRA in most respects, this part contrasts the
NLRA (and hence PRA) with the RLA, saving a discussion about the PRA to the
end.
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In the railroad industry, collective bargaining has been an accepted practice since the 1880s. 40 Government intervention was
the exception rather than the rule and occurred on an ad hoc
basis.4 1 Thus, until World War I, the focus of labor law in the
railroad industry was with means to promote voluntary dispute
settlement, as for example, the use of alternative dispute resolution processes such as fact-finding, mediation, and arbitration.4 2
This pattern continued after the war. Management and labor
continued to voluntarily bargain collectively over grievances and
revisions in pay rates and working rules without a legal framework. Work stoppages were possible constrained only by the
parties' bargaining power.
It was against this background that Congress enacted the RLA
in 1926. The RLA's legislative history reveals Congress' intent of
ratifying the existing private "treaty."4 3 There were very few enforceable provisions, relying instead on the expectation that
"most of the provisions of this bill are to be enforced by the
power of persuasion, either exercised by the parties themselves
or by the Government board of mediation representing the public interest."4 4 Thus, the RLA was conceptualized in a framework of voluntarism, and against a background of industry
practice that accepted a role for union and collective bargaining.
The NLRA evolved in a substantially different manner. Unlike the pre-RLA period, voluntarism-the approach that relied
on minimum government intervention-was not working well in
the rest of the industrial sector.45 It was apparent to Congress
40

See Dana Eischen, Representation Disputes and Their Resolution in the Rail-

road and Airline Industries, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY 1, 23-25
(Charles Rehmus ed., 1977).
41 For example, the federal government operated the nation's railways during the
World War I effort, and intervened in the operations of national railroads during the
1894 Pullman strike and the 1916 eight-hour dispute. See Dennis A. Arouca &
Henry H. Perritt Jr., Transportation Labor Regulation: Is the Railway Labor Act or
the National Labor Relations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle?, 3 LAB. L.J. 145, 14849 (1985).
42

Compare the Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501. 501-504 (1888); the

Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424, 424-428 (1898); the Newlands Act of 1913,

ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103, 103-106 (1913) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 101-125 (1994));
and the Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721-722 (1916).
See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41 at 149.
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 para. 10, 157 para. 3, para. 9, para. 10; see also Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 590-91 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
43

44

dissenting).
45

See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41. at 150.
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that without the force of law behind it, collective bargaining was
not likely to develop as the primary mechanism of industrial
governance.4
Congress first attempted to reach its goal of promoting collective bargaining by legislative means through the enactment of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. 47 The NIRA
failed to provide adequate machinery capable of confronting an
openly hostile management sector.48 In enacting the NLRA,
Congress thus was primarily concerned with the enforcement aspects of the Act. Voluntarism, and reliance on alternative dispute resolution processes were all rejected, and in their place, the
focus was placed on the use of administrative49 machinery and
traditional legal processes to implement policy.
The current legal framework governing labor relations in the
USPS is the creature of the 1970 strike by postal employees.5"
The postal strike of 1970 was the first truly national federal
strike.5" The strike began in March 1970 when postal employees
in New York City initiated a job action, which quickly spread
across the country.52 Negotiations between the Secretary of Labor and the postal union failed to produce a settlement and eventually 200,000 postal employees joined in the stoppage.53
Attempts by Congress to deal with labor strife in the postal
service were significantly constrained by the circumstances of the
moment. On the one hand, there existed intense public pressure
to settle the strike by acquiescing to a statutory framework that
would satisfy the concerns of labor.5 4 On the other hand, the
existing legal framework at the time constrained Congress' ability to determine the subject of negotiations and to define the
rights public employees could be granted.5 5
The result of this very political bargain was a statutory framework (the PRA) that embraces key aspects of both the NLRA
and the RLA. The PRA adopts the administrative apparatus of
46

Id.

47 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
48 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150.
49 Id.
50

See

MURRAY B. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-MENT

SERVICE 386-90 (1976) (describing the origins of the Postal Reorganization Act).
51 Id. at 386.

52 Id. at 387-88.
53 Id. at 388.
54 Id. at 386-90.
55 Id.
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the NLRA to protect employee concerted activity5 6 and it incorporates the RLA's promotion of mediation and arbitration to
prevent strikes.57
B.

Enforcement Machinery

One of the key differences between the statutory regimes is
the structure of the administrative machinery that has developed
over the years to enforce the statutes.5 8 The NLRA provides for
the creation of an administrative agency, the NLRB, which traditionally has broad authority to elaborate the policy embodied in
the NLRA and to flesh out the details of labor policy.5 9 The
NLRB operates in a sense as Congress' partner in fleshing out
the details of the Act.6" The result is an adjudicative system that
generates a substantial amount of litigation.6 1
The RLA administrative machinery is substantially different.62
Unlike the NLRB, the RLA's enforcing agency, the National
Mediation Board (NMB) is not involved in articulating the policy
of the RLA, or in interpreting statutory provisions.6 3
This distinction is best illustrated in the enforcement mechanisms used under the statutes. The NLRA defines a series of
unfair labor practices (ULPs). 6 ULPs constitute conduct considered illegal because of their effect on the substantive rights of
employees to self-organize, "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."6 The NLRA safeguards these rights by prohibiting cer56

39 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994).

57 Id. § 1207.
58 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150-51.

59 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1994).
60

See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150-51.

61 Id.
62 Id.

63 Paradoxically, the NMB plays a much more active role in particular areas of
industrial relations. In representation disputes, the NMB mandates details, such as
use of election ballots as remedies. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. In

interest disputes, the NMB exercises far more control over certain aspects of bargaining structure, including the timing of strikes, than the NLRB. See infra notes
137-45 and accompanying text. Also under the RLA, governmental, rather than
contractual, entities superintend railroad grievance disputes. See infra notes 114-28
and accompanying text.
64 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
65
Id. § 157.
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tain employer actions.6 6 The NLRA also outlaws a number of
union ULPs.6 7 Developing the content and extent of these ULPs
has been the role of the NLRB, and through it, the NLRB has
played a significant role in the development of labor policy.68 No
equivalent mechanism exists under the RLA.6 9 As a consequence, under the RLA courts rather than an agency interpret
the governing statute, and there is no administrative
adjudication.
Thus, as compared to the NLRA, the RLA is unlikely to generate as much litigation given the limited role that the agency
plays under the statutory scheme. This in turn should result in
greater consistency across time in the development of the RLA.
C.

Organizing Rights

One important measure for comparing the statutes is their approach to the regulation of organizing rights. Organizing rights
refer to those provisions in the statute that regulate the rights of
employees to choose whether or not to be represented by a labor
Section 158(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to:
(1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it...; (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization...; (4) to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
Id. § 158(a).
67 Section 158(b) makes it a ULP for labor organizations to:
(1) restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ... ; (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues; (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer . . ; (5)
to negotiate "closed shop" provisions; (6) to negotiate "featherbedding"
provisions; and (7) to engage in organizational and recognitional picketing
under certain circumstances.
Id. § 158(b). Section 158(e) outlaws "hot cargo" provisions. Id. § 158(e).
68 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151; cf. Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act-Time for Repeal? 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 441,503-504 (1990)
(arguing that the availability of the ULP mechanism has not played a major role in
the development of labor policy).
69 Northrup, supra note 68, at 503-04.
66
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organization, as well as the regulations regarding the union election and certification processes. Various commentators have
noted that the NLRA and the RLA differ markedly in terms of
their philosophy towards representational issues.7 ° Generally,
the representation process under the RLA appears skewed toward union representation as a premise for collective bargaining
and labor peace." The RLA reduces the possibility of representation disputes by acknowledging employees' absolute right to be
represented, and by forbidding employer interference in the
process.7 2
One of the major objectives of the RLA is to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees and to provide for the complete independence of carriers and employees in
self-organization.7 3 The RLA provides that representatives shall
be designated by the respective parties without interference, influence or coercion by the other."
The NLRA provides a similar set of protections. The NLRA
provides that employees "shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,... and shall also
75
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.,
The language of both acts, therefore, appears to be fairly similar. In their application, however, the statutes differ in one significant aspect . . .organizing rights under the RLA have been
more intensively protected than under the NLRA. 76 The RLA's
commitment to the protection of organizing rights is evidenced
by the availability under the RLA of injunctive relief for the enforcement of organizing rights and the assertiveness and creativity of the NMB in various other aspects of the organizing process.
Those two aspects are discussed in turn.
70
71
72

Id. at 478-502.
See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 152.

Id.

73 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1994). As originally enacted in 1926, the RLA did not establish procedures for resolving representation disputes. Amendments in 1934 and
1936 authorized the NMB to determine the employees' choice of representatives in
the railroad industry and extended this authority to resolve disputes in the airline
industry. See Eischen, supra note 40, at 23-69.
74 45 U.S.C. § 152 para. 3 (1994).
75 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
76 To be sure, the two statutes differ in other aspects of the representation process.
For example, the NLRA, in contrast to the RLA, permits recognitional picketing
under certain conditions for a period of up to thirty days. Id. § 158(b)(7)(c). Under
the RLA, however, unions are allowed to exercise secondary pressure. See infra
notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
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Under the RLA, parties rely on the injunctive power of the
federal district courts to enforce statutory rights.7 7 Those rights
include the prohibitions against carrier interference with the organizational rights of employees.78 For example, terminating an
employee for union activity is an interference with such rights. It
has been argued that the availability of this relatively quick injunctive relief "has had such a strong deterrent effect on carrier
conduct that discriminatory discharges to discourage unioniza' 79
tion rarely occur under the RLA.
Although a similar mechanism is available under the NLRA ,8o
courts have been generally reluctant to use injunctions as a way
of protecting organizing rights."1 Instead, the administrative process of the NLRA has been utilized, resulting, in what some argue is a lack of protection for workers attempting to organize
collectively.8 2
An important, yet overlooked, aspect of the differences between the RLA and the NLRA is the manner in which the enforcing agencies regulate the union certification and election
processes. Both statutes provide some latitude to the enforcing
agencies to enforce the organizing rights of employees. The extent to which the enforcing agency utilizes this flexibility significantly affects the organizing outcomes under both statutes.
Again, significant differences are apparent when comparing the
NLRB and the NMB.
Somewhat uncharacteristically, the NMB has been much more
aggressive in conducting representation elections, as well as in
developing creative approaches to remedy violations of the statute. For example, the NMB has refused to give employees an
opportunity to vote "no union. ' 83 Employees who oppose union
representation can express their position only by refraining from
voting." The NMB justifies its election on the grounds that
such procedure permits employees to secure some form of
77 Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).

78 45 U.S.C. § 152 paras. 3-4 (1994).
79 See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discriminationfor Union Activity
Under the NLRA and the RLA, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J., 317, 334 (1998).
80 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1994).
81 See Morris, supra note 79, at 334.
82 Id.
83 See Northrup, supra note 68, at 496.
84 The NMB, however, will certify a union only when more than fifty percent of
those eligible vote. Id.
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representation.8 5
The NMB has also been innovative in their philosophy towards
modifications of ballots to remedy violations of the election process. When the NMB finds carrier interference, it employs a variety of special ballots and notices intended to eliminate the taint
of interference on the employees' freedom of choice of representative.86 The NMB's methods of determining the employees'
choice of representative vary on a continuum determined by the
extent of the carrier interference found.8 7
For example, in response to conduct by employers such as
soliciting employees to turn in their ballots to an employer's official, increasing wages before the election period, and polling of
employees, the NMB has ordered a re-run election using a "Yes"
or "No" ballot with no write-in space provided. 88 Unlike the regular election procedure, under this remedial ballot-known as
the Laker ballot-the majority of votes cast determine the outcome of the election.
In cases involving more egregious conduct by the employer,
the NMB has employed procedures designed to provide increasing safeguards for employees' freedom of choice of their representative.8 9 The so-called Key ballot is designed with the purpose
of certifying the union, unless a majority of eligible voters return
votes opposing union representation.9"
The NLRB has been substantially less aggressive in the use of
alternative ballot procedures as a mechanism to respond to em85 Id. The NLRB certifies on the basis of a majority of those voting, even if less
than fifty percent of the eligible employees participate in the election. Thus, although the NLRB certifies election results only on the basis of those voting (therefore making it possible that a union might be certified without more than fifty
percent of eligible employees voting), it encourages participation in the election by
giving those employees who oppose union representation the alternative to vote "no
union." Id.
86

See Ronald C. Henson & Michael J. Gaugh, Carrier Election Campaigns,
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Vol. I, No. SD50, 81, 99 (1999).
87 Id.

88 In re Laker Airways, Ltd., 8 N.M.B. 236 (1981).

89 For example in Key Airlines the carrier's activities included denying a scheduled pay increase to employees in one craft or class immediately after a representation application was filed, holding meetings for the express purpose of discouraging
organization and threatening employees' job security should they vote for representation. The carrier also issued a letter criticizing the organization (International
Brotherhood of Teamsters) that included comments such as: "[do] you want to be a
partner with an organization that has such a sordid reputation as the Teamsters." In
re Key Airlines, 16 N.M.B. 296, 303 (1989).
90 Id. at 296.
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ployers' interference with the election process. The NLRB does
not use any alternative ballots, limiting its remedial powers primarily to re-running elections and in extreme cases (when employers' unfair labor practices are thought to preclude the
holding of an election), to issuing bargaining orders.
Curiously, the NMB has taken one position regarding organizing rights that commentators have considered to be less protective of employee rights. Paragraph nine of the RLA requires the
NMB to investigate representation disputes and to determine, by
secret ballot or other means, which organization or individual, if
any, represents a "craft or class." 9 1 From its inception, the NMB
has indicated a strong preference for carrier-wide units of a craft
or class.

92

Although the NMB has modified its original position pertaining to bargaining units,93 it continues for the most part to insist
on certification of bargaining representatives according to historic craft or class lines. This practice continues, despite the
changing face of the transportation industry through new technology, new competition, and alteration of industry structure, 94
and notwithstanding the NMB's clear authority to "regroup,
amalgamate or splinter historic bargaining groups . . ." as conditions change.95
The NLRA provides for the organization of employees in "a
unit appropriate" for the purposes of collective bargaining.9 6
Unlike the NMB, the NLRB has substantial discretion to determine the "appropriateness" of a unit. Under the NLRA, labor
91 45 U.S.C. § 152 para. 9 (1994).
92 For example, the NMB placed all clerical employees, freight handlers, and station and store employees into one bargaining unit, apparently because this bargaining unit has been previously organized by the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers and Station and Store Employees. See Eischen,
supra note 40, at 58-68.
93 In re Ground Servs., Inc., 8 N.M.B. 35 (1980); In re Union Pac. R.R., 8 N.M.B.
127 (1981).
94 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 162.
95 U.N.A. Chapter, Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 294 F.2d 905,
908 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
96 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). Under the NLRA, the primary focus in determining
an appropriate bargaining unit is that employees with a community of interest
should be grouped together. The NLRB inquires into a number of factors to test the
community of interest: extent and type of union organization; bargaining history for
the employees involved and in the particular industry at issue; similarity of duties,
skills, interests, and working conditions: and structure of the company, and em-

ployee desires. See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353,

383 (1984).
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and management can agree to the bargaining unit, although the
NLRB is not obligated to ratify any such agreement it believes
does not provide for bargaining through an appropriate unit for
such purposes.9 7 Thus, the NLRA's policy regarding bargaining
unit determinations has resulted, for the most part, in a practice
of certifying smaller bargaining units, or at least units in which
employees share a common set of experiences (either geographical location, or in terms of skills and functions).
In short, regarding organizing rights, it appears that except for
its position regarding the definition of bargaining units, the RLA
facilitates the process of forming unions. 98
D.

Collective Bargaining

As in the case of representational issues, the RLA and NLRA
statutory language regarding collective bargaining rights is substantially similar. Paragraph one of the RLA establishes "the
duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle
all disputes" peacefully.9 9 Similarly, the NLRA imposes a duty
to bargain, which means that parties are required to meet and
confer in good faith in an attempt to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. 1" An employer is required to refrain from
unilaterally altering those wages, terms and working conditions
that are considered "subjects of mandatory bargaining" until impasse has been reached."° ' A union must refrain from striking if
there is a contractual no-strike clause in effect and the collective
97

See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 162.

98 The RLA also provides a greater degree of protection for maintaining a union's
bargaining representative status. In contrast to the NLRA, which specifically allows
for a decertification process, the RLA does not include any such procedure. 29
U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). The lack of a formal decertification process is
further evidence of the favorable disposition to union organizing under the RLA, as
compared to the NLRA.

99 45 U.S.C. § 152 para. 1 (1994). The process of collective bargaining is defined
to include: (1) a written notice thirty days before an intended change of an agreement; (2) a time and place to meet must be agreed upon within ten days after receipt
of such notice, and the meeting must occur within thirty days as provided in the
notice; and (3) prohibition of unilateral changes in contracts and of strikes and lockouts during this procedure and the intervention that ensues. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 paras.
6-7, 156 (1994).
100 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
101 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
HeinOnline -- 80 Or. L. Rev. 961 2001

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80, 20011

bargaining agreement has not expired. 102 In practice, however,
the two statutes differ markedly in one key aspect: the scope of
10 3
the duty of bargaining.
The NLRA imposes on employers and unions a duty to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."'" Courts, however, have not been willing to require
employers to bargain over all issues that fall within the statutory
language.'0 5 Rather, they have developed a distinction between
mandatory subjects of bargaining, which are within the duty to
6
bargain, and permissive subjects of bargaining, which are not.'
The Supreme Court has defined mandatory subjects as to exclude certain areas that fall within the exclusive control of management. 10 7 The Court's reasoning suggests that many other
strategic-level corporate decisions are not subject to mandatory
bargaining."0 8
Under the RLA, in contrast, the scope of the duty to bargain
has been viewed traditionally as extremely broad. Courts have
102 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway
Labor Act and the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1495 (1990).
103 Various other differences exist. For example, under the RLA, the statute itself
imposes an obligation not to strike over interest (major) disputes or rights (minor)
disputes until the statutory dispute resolution processes have been exhausted. 45
U.S.C. § 152 para. 1 (1994). Under the NLRA, any obligation not to strike is primarily contractual. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1496. In addition, unlike
collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA, agreements under the RLA do
not have an expiration date. Periodic requests for changes in specific wage rates or
rules are made by filing a statutory notice of intent to change the existing agreement
under section 6 of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994). As a result, agreements in the
railroad industry include provisions that are decades old, as well as recently negotiated provisions. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1495. The NLRA, on the
other hand, gives statutory approval to agreements for a fixed term. Under the
NLRA a party desiring to change the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
must give sixty days advance notice to the opposing side. If the agreement is for a
fixed term, the sixty-day notice is not effective until sixty days prior to the date the
agreement may be modified or terminated. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
1041Id.
105 For example, in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666
(1981), the Supreme Court held that a company has no duty to bargain over a decision to close a part of its business. The Court justified this limitation on the scope of
bargaining by defining certain areas as domains of exclusive management prerogative. Id.
106 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
107 First Nat'l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 683-85.
108 Id. (finding no duty to bargain over decision to shut down part of a business);
cf. In re Dubuque Packing Co. (II), 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 390-92 (1991) (announcing a
new test to determine whether an employer's decisions to relocate bargaining units
work is a mandatory subject).
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generally held that the RLA's duty to bargain includes bargain-

ing over all issues that come within the statutory phrase, "rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions."1" 9 Courts interpreting this
provision have not incorporated into the RLA the NLRA's
mandatory-permissive issues distinction.l° According to the Supreme Court, "the trend of legislation affecting railroads and
railroad employees has been to broaden, not narrow, the scope
of subjects about which workers and railroads may or must negotiate and bargain collectively." 1 1'
Thus, for example in interpreting the duty to bargain under the
RLA, courts have required the employer to bargain over decisions such as leasing the employer's facilities, t1 2 as well as the
13
closing and moving of operations out of the country.
E. Dispute Resolution
In comparing the two statutes on the dispute resolution dimension, it is helpful to distinguish between the statute's approach to
the resolution of grievances on the one hand, and the resolution
of work stoppages on the other.
109 45 U.S.C. § 152 paras. 1-2 (1994).
110 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1527.
111 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 338 (1960).
The Supreme Court continued to adhere to the view of defining the duty to bargain
broadly under the RLA, at least until 1989. In that year the Court issued a decision
that challenges the broad construction of the duty to bargain. In Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 503-04 (1989),
the Supreme Court held that the employer did not have an obligation to bargain
over a decision to sell its assets. According to the Court, such a decision was a
management prerogative, and not a subject about which section 6 bargaining could
be required. The Court stated that
the decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management
prerogative that only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent
will suffice to require the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending
the fulfillment of any duty it may have to bargain over the subject matter of
union notices such as were served in this litigation. Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the decision of a railroad employer to go out of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is not
a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo provisions of [section 6].
Id. at 509.
Although this language appears to incorporate the NLRA's mandatory-permissive distinction, there is language in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie that seemingly limits the
Court's decision. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1535.
112 United Indus. Workers v. Bd. of Trs. of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1965).
113 Ruby v. TACA Int'l Airlines, 439 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Resolution of Grievances

For the railroad industry, the RLA establishes an industrywide grievance apparatus for the resolution of minor disputes. 14
This structure, which has developed over the years, provides the
contracting parties with various venues to pursue the resolution
of grievances.115 Originally the RLA created the National Railroad Adjustment Board and gave it jurisdiction over all "minor
disputes" involving railroad carriers. 1 6
In subsequent amendments to the RLA, and in order to alleviate caseload problems, Congress established the Special Boards
of Adjustment (SBAs), and the Public Law Boards (PLBs). 117
These boards provide alternative fora for the resolution of minor
disputes. PLBs and SBAs are different from the NRAB in that
their procedures are somewhat more flexible, and are of a more
voluntary nature. 1 8
While different in detail, these venues are similar in some important respects. First, not only is the existence of the boards
statutorily mandated but also their structure and their jurisdic114 A minor dispute "relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision [of a collective agreement] with reference to a specific situation or
to an omitted case." Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 713 (1945),
affd on reh'g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); see also Jonathan Cohen & James Lobsenz,
Grievance Resolution and the System Board of Adjustment, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS, Vol. I, No. SD50, 357 (1999).
115 These include the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Special Boards of
Adjustment, and the Public Law Boards. Id. at 381, 390-94.
11645 U.S.C. § 153 para. 1 (1994). The NRAB is formed of four independent
divisions, each having jurisdiction over particular crafts. Id. § 153(h). The First Division has jurisdiction over disputes involving "engineers, firemen, hostlers, and
outside hostler helpers, conductors, trainmen and yard-service employees." Id. The
Second Division has jurisdiction over the "shop craft" employees. Id. The Third
Division has jurisdiction over disputes involving clerical, maintenance-of-way, signal,
and dispatcher forces. Id. The Fourth Division considers disputes involving water
transportation employees and any other employees who are not covered by the first
three divisions. Id. Each division has an equal number of management and union
representatives. Recently, the NRAB has handled about fifteen percent of railroad
grievances. NAT'L MEDIATION BD., FIFTY-NINE, SIXTIETH AND SIXTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORTS

39 (1995).

11745 U.S.C. § 153 para. 2 (1994). The SBAs operate at the system, group, or
regional level, to resolve minor disputes otherwise referable to the NRAB.
118 See Joshua M. Javits, Grievance Procedures: The Carrier'sPerspective, A.L.I.A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Vol. I. No. SD50, 81, 99 (1999). PLBs and
SBAs do not provide for individual employee processing of grievances. SBAs require that both parties consent to the submission of the dispute, but, either party can
request in writing that the dispute proceed before a PLB. The NMB estimates that
approximately twenty-eight percent of the grievances referred to it are handled by
SBAs and sixty percent are handled by PLBs. Id. at 392.
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tion are statutorily provided. Second, they are all publicly financed, substantially reducing the costs to the parties utilizing
their services.
The procedure for the airline industry is different. When the
airline industry was brought under the RLA, Congress empowered the NMB to establish a National Air Transport Adjustment
Board, along the lines of the National Railway Adjustment
Board.1 19 Anticipating a possible delay by the NMB in establishing this new board, Congress imposed an obligation to establish
individual carrier system boards of adjustment. 120 However,
Congress left it to the contracting parties to decide the structure
as well as the authority granted to the boards. Thus, in the airline industry the RLA leaves the parties with broad flexibility to
determine, through the collective bargaining process, the
12 1
makeup of boards and the procedural powers granted to them.
This distinction has had a significant impact on the performance of the various mechanisms under the RLA for the resolution of minor disputes. The caseload of the NRAB has been
characterized as exorbitant. 122 The caseloads of the SBAs and
the PLBs have been notoriously high. For example, in fiscal year
1995, PLBs closed 3,474 cases, leaving 6,409 cases pending. 23 In
the same year, SBAs closed 1,514 cases and left 1,317 cases pending.1 24 Commentators have noted that such a caseload exists in
no other industry.1 25 Besides the quantity, it can take several
26
years to decide cases, thus exacerbating the problem.
In contrast to the structure used in the railroad industry, the
boards of adjustment in the airline industry are financed by the
11945 U.S.C. § 184 (1994).
120 See Javits, supra note 118, at 383.
121 Id. at 384.
122 See Northrup, supra note 68. at 474.
23

1

See NAT'L MEDIATION BD., supra note 116, at 40.

Id.
125 See Northrup, supra note 68, at 474.
124

126 Since 1992, the number of cases received under section 153 has decreased significantly, as has the backlog of cases. According to NMB statistics, in 1992 the
number of railroad arbitration cases pending was 11,736. In 1995, the number decreased to 9,661. See NAT'L MEDIATION BD., supra note 116, at 24. The NMB
attributes this reduction to a number of administrative measures taken over the last
few years. For example, the NMB now requires the parties to provide a case number and a subject code identifying the issue for each case pending under section 153.
This requirement forces the parties to look at each case and determine at the earliest
possible stage if the case has become moot, has settled, or has been abandoned.
More recently, the NMB has also been a proponent of expedited boards.
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contracting parties. As a result, there is no evidence of any significant arbitration backlogs or delays. 127 "One need look no
further than the airlines to find sufficient proof that the cure for
the case load deluge in railroad grievances can be obtained by
forcing the parties to pay for their own excessive use of the
28
process."1
The NLRA is completely silent on the issue of the resolution
of grievances, leaving it to the parties themselves to devise the
proper structure. Grievance procedures exist in almost every
union contract covered by the NLRA. 12' 9 Grievance procedures
tend to have the same key features across workplaces, including
a definition that limits grievances to claims of contract violations,
an emphasis on written processing, a series of ascending steps up
to the terminal stage (usually arbitration) and explicit time limits
for each stage. 3 °
The grievance arbitration process has become firmly embedded in the union-management relationship.13 ' Although there is
substantial variation across industries on the number of grievances filed per year, grievance filing is a permanent component
127 See Northrup, supra note 68, at 478.
Id.
129 See Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiersin the Unionized Workplace, in
WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17 (Sandra Gleason ed., 1997).
130 See David Lewin, Theoreticaland EmpiricalResearch on the Grievance Procedure and Arbitration: A Critical Review, in EMPLOYMENT DIsPUTE RESOLUTION
128

AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE

137, 145-58 (Adrienne E.

Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999).
131 The success of the voluntary approach to grievance resolution under the
NLRA has been due in part to the strong support the grievance arbitration process
has received from the Supreme Court. In 1960 the Supreme Court decided three
cases ("the Steelworkers Trilogy") setting the ground rules for the relationship between the judiciary and the arbitration process. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Taken together, the three opinions show a clear
judicial decision to support the voluntary process of grievance arbitration by putting
the force of law behind it. The decisions are highly deferential to arbitration agreements entered into by labor and management and to the decisions of arbitrators
pursuant to such agreements. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDER-STANDING LABOR LAW 342-45 (1999). Under the Steelworkers Trilogy, courts should enforce a
contractual promise to arbitrate (Am. Mfg. Co.); and should use a presumption of
arbitrability in determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a type or class of
dispute (Gulf Navigation Co.). Courts finding arbitrability should order arbitration
without inquiring into the merits of the underlying grievance, and when reviewing
the award itself, should enforce the awards so long as it can be said to have "drawn
its essence" from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp.).
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of the industrial relations process under the NLRA. 132 Grievance procedures under the NLRA appear to operate in an efficient manner. Most grievances are resolved during the early
stages of the grievance process, within two months of the filing
date.' 33 These resolutions usually are achieved without outside
assistance, so for the typical grievance the processing costs are
relatively low. The efficiency with which most grievance procedures dispose of grievances at early stages means that only a
small fraction of grievances are arbitrated. Several studies have
in most workplaces is quite low,
shown that the arbitration rate
34
averaging about ten percent.1
2.

Resolution of Work Stoppages

Economic action is an integral part of our national labor policy, and both statutes reflect this philosophy. The right to strike
is protected implicitly under the RLA, and explicitly by the
NLRA. The two Acts differ significantly, however, in the extent
to which labor and management may control when the right of
economic action can be exercised.
Among the major policy objectives of the RLA are the avoidance of any interruption to commerce and the provision of a system for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.1 35 In accordance with these purposes, the RLA mandates that carriers
and employees exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions and to settle all disputes in order to avoid any
136
interruption to commerce.
Under the RLA, the parties may not exercise economic action
until the "major dispute" procedures of the Act have been exhausted.' 37 These procedures include negotiation, mediation,
and at the option of the President, an emergency board. 138 These
procedures also provide that a party wishing to change rates of
pay, rules or working conditions must give thirty days written no132 See Lewin, supra note 130, at 145.
133 See Feuille, supra note 129, at 32.
134 Id. at 33.
135 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1994).
136 Id.

137 Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142
(1969).
138 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
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tice to parties interested in such changes.' 3 9 Following this notice, bargaining can commence. 4 ° If bargaining fails to resolve
the dispute, either party may invoke the services of the NMB.14 1
The NMB assigns a mediator to meet with the parties and attempt to induce an agreement. 142 If mediation fails, the NMB
the parties' consent to submit the dispute
must attempt to obtain143
arbitration.
binding
to
If the parties reject the offer of arbitration, and if the NMB
believes that the dispute threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of
the country of essential transportation service," the NMB must
notify the President, who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. 144 After the Presidential
Emergency Board (PEB) report is submitted, a thirty-day cooling-off period begins during which the parties are required to further maintain the status quo. 145 After the thirty-day period,
either party may resort to self-help: management may implement its unilateral changes to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and unions may strike.
Most important to the major dispute resolution procedures is
that during the bargaining and mediation process both parties
are subject to a status quo obligation-no changes to rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions are permitted. Furthermore,
federal courts have the power under the RLA to enjoin status
1 46
quo violations.
Out of more than thirteen thousand mediation disputes beId.
Id. § 152 para. 2.
Id. § 155 para. 1.
29 C.F.R. § 1203.1 (1990).
143 45 U.S.C. § 155 para. 1(b) (1994).
144 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1994). This section requires emergency boards to present
their findings to the President within thirty days after their appointment and prohibits the parties to the dispute from changing the status quo (except by agreement)
during the board's deliberations and for thirty days thereafter. Id. The courts have
construed this language to prohibit strikes. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969).
145 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994).
146 Because the status quo provisions of the RLA enable unions to delay implementation of strategic-level corporate decisions, carriers frequently contend that
their contested decisions or unilateral actions are not governed by the Act's status
quo provisions at all. Rather, they often claim that a dispute is subject to a different
dispute-resolution mechanism in the Act, the grievance and arbitration procedures.
Such arguments have not received sanction from courts. See Van Wezel Stone,
supra note 102, at 1500.
139
140
141
142
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tween 1934 and 1999, emergency boards have been appointed
234 times-201 in the railroad industry and thirty-three in the
airline industry. 147 On average, boards were used a little over

four times each year from 1925 through the 1960s.148 There was a
small decline in the use of emergency boards during the 1960s
149
and 1970s to an average of three emergency boards per year.
A sharper decline occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.15 ° Emergency boards were appointed in the railroad industry an average
of only twice per year, while in the airline industry only one
emergency board has been appointed in the last two decades.' 5 '
Unlike the RLA, which postpones the right of economic action, the NLRA allows economic pressure except as regulated by
section 13 of the Act, or through a collective bargaining agreement. 152 The statutory requirements are fairly minimal, primarily involving notice requirements.' 5 3 In lieu of any statutory
147 See Nat'l Medication Bd., Frequency of Presidential Emergency Boards in
Railroad and Airline Collective Bargaining Disputes under the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), 1934-1999, at http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/pebchart34-0t.pdf (last visited
Jan. 27, 2002).
148 See Charles Rehmus, Emergency Strikes Revisited, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 175, 177 (1990).
149 Beginning with the Nixon Administration, the White House has been reluctant
to appoint emergency boards as a matter of course, believing that such routine appointments inappropriately interfere with free collective bargaining. Figures are
taken from the National Mediation Board Annual Report for various years.
150 See Rehmus, supra note 148 at 177.
151 Only one Airline PEB was established under RLA procedures over the past
thirty-three years. Since the mid-1960s, governmental policy has discouraged the
use of PEBs in airline labor-management disputes. The emergency board established in the American Airlines-Allied Pilots Association dispute (P.E.B. No. 233)
on March 19, 1997, was an exception to this long-standing policy.
Two other trends are worth mentioning regarding the appointment of emergency
boards. First, the vast majority of emergency boards have been appointed to deal
with disputes involving publicly owned commuter rail operations. See Rehmus,
supra note 148, at 180. Because the RLA allows for the creation of an emergency
board if "any section" of the nation is deprived of essential transportation services,
the "national" character of these emergencies is highly questionable. Id. Second,
since 1963 when President Kennedy sent to Congress a dispute involving the National Railway Labor Conference and the five operating brotherhoods and in which
Congress intervened by creating a compulsory arbitration board, congressional action to resolve rail labor disputes has been fairly common. Id. at 182-87. In its 1994
report on the future of worker-management relations, the Dunlop Commission
noted that out of the seventeen times that Congress has had to intervene in rail
disputes, five occurred between 1990 and 1994. See FACr FINDING REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

98-103 (1994).

152 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
153 Section 158(d) requires sixty days advance notice of a party's desire to change
the terms of the agreement. If the agreement is for a fixed term, however, the sixty-
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constraints, the parties themselves are encouraged to adopt provisions, through collective bargaining, that are intended to regulate the occurrence of economic action. For example, collective
bargaining agreements usually contain clauses negotiated by the
154
parties, limiting their ability to engage in economic action.
Thus, under the NLRA the parties have a greater opportunity, as
compared to the RLA, to affect the timing of economic action.
Similar to the RLA, the NLRA provides for a special procedure in cases involving national emergency disputes. Under the
1947 amendments to the NLRA, a multi-step process is established involving presidential and judicial intervention.1 55 First, if
the President decides that a threatened or actual work stoppage
affects "an entire or substantial part" of an industry or will "imperil the national health or safety," 15' 6 he may appoint a board of
inquiry to conduct hearings into the dispute. 57 The board will
issue a report, at which time the President can direct the Attor158
If
ney General to petition a federal judge to enjoin the strike.
the injunction is granted, the parties to the dispute must attempt
to settle their differences with the help of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, and the President must reconvene the
board of inquiry. If there is not settlement at the end of a sixtyday period, the board of inquiry must issue another report to the
president on the current positions of the parties. 159 Economic
action is further delayed until the NLRB certifies that the employees have rejected, by secret ballot, the employer's last offer,
whereupon the injunction is vacated. 6 ° The President may then
161
recommend a resolution of the dispute to Congress.
day notice of desire to change the agreement is not effective until sixty days prior to
the date the agreement may be modified or terminated. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
Economic action that occurs before that time has expired is an unfair labor practice,
and the employees who take such action lose their statutory rights. Section 158(d),
however, does not delay economic action over matters not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, and not otherwise disposed of in negotiations, until the end
of the contract term. Only a sixty-day notice is necessary as to those issues.
154 For example, through the use of "zipper clauses," In re Radioear Corp., 214
N.L.R.B. 362, 363-64 (1974), and arbitration clauses, Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the parties can regulate the scope and timing of
economic pressure.
15529 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994).
156 Id. § 176.
157 Id.
158 Id. § 178.
159 Id. § 179.
160 Id.
161 Id. § 180.
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The procedure for emergency disputes under the NLRA involves not only a decision by the executive, but also the "approval" of the judicial branch. Case law regarding judicial review
of presidential decisions under the NLRA emergency procedure
is unsettled, however. In Steelworkers v. United States,162 the Supreme Court confronted a challenge to an injunction granted by
the lower court, following President Truman's decision to invoke
the emergency procedure of the NLRA. In responding to a
union challenge that the emergency procedures were unconstitutional, the Court acknowledged that no injunction could issue
under the Taft-Hartley Act unless the district court finds that a
strike or lockout meets the statutory conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national health or safety. 16 3 The Court
found the injunction justified on the ground that the strike's ef164
fect on specific defense projects imperiled the national safety.
In so ruling, the Court found it unnecessary to decide between
the government's claim that the statutory term "national health"
comprehends general economic well-being of the country, and
the union's claim that only the physical health of the citizenry
1 65
was intended.
In only two other instances have federal courts faced requests
by the federal government regarding the NLRA's emergency disputes procedures. In United States v. International Longshoremen Ass'n,166 a district court denied the government's request
for an emergency strike injunction for the first time since Congress enacted the Act. 1 67 Finally, in an unreported 1978 decision,
a district court refused to renew a temporary restraining order
initially issued under the Taft-Hartley emergency dispute proce162 361 U.S. 39 (1959). Steelworkers arose out of a nationwide steel strike, which
began on July 5, 1959. President Truman invoked the Taft-Hartley procedure on
October 9, and the district court granted an injunction on October 21. The court of
appeals affirmed. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court decided the case in a short, per
curiam opinion due to the necessity for prompt adjudication. Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan subsequently wrote a more complete concurring opinion filed December
7, 1959.
163 Id. at 42.
164 Id.
165 Id.

166 335 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. I11.1971).

167 Id. at 505; see also United States v. Portland Longshoremen's Benevolent
Soc'y Local 861, 336 F. Supp. 504, 505 (D. Me. 1971) (granting Taft-Hartley injunction in similar strike and criticizing Illinois court for examining only events occurring
within its jurisdiction).
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1 68
dures because the statutory standard was not met.
These three decisions have produced some degree of uncertainty regarding the standard under which a petition for an injunction will be reviewed. The President needs to consider the
likelihood that a district court judge might refuse to grant an injunction. This uncertainty may explain the reduced frequency
with which the President has invoked the emergency procedures
in recent years.
Similar to the experience of the RLA, the NLRA national
emergency provisions were used more intensively in the first few
decades after their enactment. In the first twenty-two years following their enactment, the emergency provisions were used
twenty-nine times, and never in that period did even two years
pass without their initiation. 6 9 Since 1970, however, they have
been used only six times. The last of these episodes involved the
1977-1978 coal strike, in which a federal court refused to grant an
emergency dispute injunction on the ground that the strike had
not been shown to have resulted in "irreparable harm to the national health or safety." More recently, President Clinton considered but decided against using the emergency dispute procedure
in the strike by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
against United Parcel Service. Similarly, various parties sought
presidential intervention during the 1994 Major League Baseball
strike.

F.

The Special Case of the Postal Reorganization Act

The PRA is the outcome of the 1970 strike by postal employees. 170 Under the PRA, postal employees were given the right to
determine compensation, hours, benefits and terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining. 17 1 Grievances and adverse actions under the agreement are subject to
negotiations. 172 The NLRB alone supervises representation elections and enforces the unfair labor practice provisions contained
in the NLRA, as well as determines the appropriate bargaining
unit under the same criteria applied in the private sector. 173 Su168 See John A. Ackermann, The Impact of the Coal Strike of 1977-78, 32 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 175, 187 (1979).
169 See Rehmus, supra note 148, at 176-78.
170 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1207 (1994).
171 Id. § 1203.
172 Id. § 1206(b).

173 Id. § 1203.
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pervisory and managerial personnel are excluded from the collective bargaining process but are assured pay differentials over
their subordinates.' 7 4 Their associations are provided with consultation and participation rights in the planning and development of their pay policies and fringe benefits.
Given the prohibitions against strikes by federal employees,
the PRA provides for alternative methods to resolve bargaining
impasses.' 75 Similar to the NLRA, the PRA requires the party
desiring to terminate or modify the agreement to give written
notice to the other party no less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the agreement, or from the time it is proposed to
make the termination or modification. 7 6 The party serving the
notice must also notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) of the existence of the dispute, if within fortyfive days of serving notice the parties have failed to reach an
177
agreement.
The PRA then adopts procedures somewhat similar to those of
the RLA, by providing fact-finding procedures by the FMCS
whenever the parties fail to reach an agreement or to adopt a
procedure for binding resolution by the expiration of the agreement. 178 The fact-finding panel is required to issue a report, with
or without recommendations. 79 Finally, the PRA goes further
than either the NLRA or RLA, by providing for binding arbitration if the bargaining impasse persists for 180 days from the start
of negotiations.'8 0
Postal employees have been relatively successful at negotiating
improvements in wages and working conditions.' 8 ' Between
1970 and 1977, they increased their salaries by ninety-four percent, compared with forty-seven percent for other federal salaries.' 82 The Postal Service and the unions have proceeded to
174 Id. § 1202.
175 Id. § 1207.
176 Id. § 1207(a).
177

Id.

178 Id. § 1207(b).
179

Id.

180 Id. § 1207(c).
181 See Michael Wachter & Jeffrey Perloff, A Comparative Analysis of Wage Premiums and Industrial Relations in the British Post Office and the United States Postal
Service, in COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN POSTAL SERVICES 36 (Michael A.
Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1991).
182

Id.
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arbitration on several occasions.183 For example, in 1990 the National Association of Letter Carriers (Letter Carriers) and the
American Postal Workers union, in joint negotiations, rejected
management demands for a two-tier wage schedule.' 8 4 An arbitration panel awarded a higher wage package than that proposed
by the employer, but the decision also established a schedule of
wages for new hires significantly below existing entry levels.18 5
Thus, both the employer and the unions were forced to accept
compromises.186 More recently, in 1998, bargaining between the
Letter Carriers and USPS broke down when four weeks of medi8 7
ation between the parties failed to produce a new agreement.
A three-member arbitration panel convened to resolve the dispute issued an award in September 1999.188
The PRA therefore embraces key aspects of both the NLRA
and the RLA: it adopts the administrative apparatus of the
NLRA to protect employee concerted activity; and it incorporates the RLA's promotion of mediation and arbitration to prevent strikes.
III
ASSESSING THE REGULATORY COSTS OF THE
THREE REGIMES

A.

Introduction

The prior section reveals that there exists considerable variation in regulatory approaches under the NLRA, the RLA, and
the PRA. Although the three schemes share much in common,
their distinctive histories and purposes have bred substantial variation in employer obligations and employee rights as well. This
section analyzes those differences in an effort to assess employers' comparative costs of proceeding under the three labor-management frameworks, and thus evaluate the potential
competitive advantages and barriers that the regulatory regimes
183 See Postal Service, Four Unions Fail to Reach Pact, Invoking Arbitration,
DAILY LAB. REP. NEWS, Nov. 23, 1990, at A-2.

184 Id.
185 See New Postal Service Contract Includes Modest Wage Increases, DAILY LAB.
REP. NEWS, June 13, 1991, at A-3.
186 Id.

187 See Louis C. LaBrecque, Postal Workers: Arbitration Panel Settles Contract
Dispute with NALC; Award Includes Higher Pay Scale, DAILY LAB. REP. NEWS,
Sept. 21, 1999, at A-2.
188 Id.
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imposed on the members of the express package delivery
industry.
The analysis focuses on three aspects of the respective regulatory systems: litigation, administration of labor management relations, and the regulation of work stoppages. Although there is
no accepted way of characterizing the costs imposed by a laborrelations regime, these three types of costs arguably constitute
the most important categories.
B.

Litigation Costs

One initial point of comparison among the three statutes relates to the amount of litigation that we should expect to be generated under each statutory regime. Different amounts of
litigation should generate different costs-I refer to these as litigation costs. Litigation costs include expenses associated with
resolution of grievances as well as court litigation. Litigation
costs can be difficult to quantify. Company lawyers do not always keep accurate time sheets, and assessing the cost due to
time lost for company personnel to prepare testimony or appear
in proceedings is daunting. Nonetheless, even based on payments to outside counsel, litigation costs for a large company
reach millions of dollars each year.
Three aspects of litigation costs must be considered: (1)
whether parties are as likely to raise disputes under the different
legal regimes, (2) whether the different regulatory structures engender the same number of litigable issues, and (3) whether the
costs of litigating such issues vary depending upon the particular
regime.
1.

Culture

In assessing the amount of litigation under the respective regimes, culture plays a surprisingly significant role. History and
experience have encouraged a culture of mediation under the
RLA. 18 9 In sharp contrast, the culture developed under the
NLRA is based on confrontation. 19 0 Like the NLRA, the PRA
developed in the context of an openly contentious relationship
between postal workers and the USPS. 19 ' While aspects of this
relationship continue to be less than cooperative, there has been
189 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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marked improvement. 19 2 As a consequence of the different histories and practices, the incidence of litigation is likely to be
greater under the NLRA than under the other two regimes.
From its origins, the RLA has encouraged a culture of confrontation avoidance. As described earlier, collective bargaining
in the railroad industry existed for at least forty years before the
enactment of the Act.'9 3 Such bargaining occurred in an atmosphere where the resort to litigation was not considered a legitimate bargaining tool.
The political evolution of the NLRA, however, was substantially different. 1 94 Congress enacted the NLRA against a background of contentious relations between labor and
management. 19 5 Legislative attempts during the preceding years
focused on the promotion of collective bargaining, but failed to
overcome employers' open defiance. 196 The drafting of the
NLRA thus focused on enforcement, with concentration on administrative agency models and on traditional legal processes to
implement policy. 97
Congress developed the PRA in direct response to the postal
workers strike of 1970.198 Congress adopted a "quasi" private
model, under which postal workers were to be treated as private
sector employees under the NLRA, but without the ability to
strike.' 99 This structure appears to have resulted in a bi-modal
culture. Regarding the organizing processes, the parties appear
to have reached a culture of accommodation and cooperation. 0 0
This is probably due to the fact that in the public sector there has
traditionally been less opposition from employers to union organizing.z 1 Similarly, over the last decade, there has been a lot
of experimentation in the postal sector with cooperative programs.20 2 These experiments have proven to be very successful
192

Id.

193

See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 149.
See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150.

194
195

196 Id.

See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
199 Id.
200 Id.
197

A.

& HARRY C. KATZ, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
438-41 (1988) (discussing the political dimension of the employer (government) in the public sector context).
201

See

THOMAS

KOCHAN

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

202 See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why
Transformative Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 367 (2001).
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and have resulted in the development of a culture of trust among
the parties.113 On the other hand, there appears to be a heavy
reliance on the use of the NLRB's administrative machinery,
which indicates a propensity to litigate at the administrative
agency level."
Thus, the differing backgrounds of the three
statutes likely set the framework for greater litigiousness under
the NLRA than under the RLA and PRA.
2.

Structure of the Statutes

The structure of the NLRA and RLA bears out what the historical settings suggest. For a number of reasons, the NLRA anticipates far greater litigation than under the other regime.
First, Congress has included a list of unfair labor practices that
can be raised by either employers or employees only under the
NLRA and PRA.2 °5 For example, covered employees can assert
that management has discriminated against them because of their
concerted activity, 2 6 that management has formed or dominated
an employee organization, 2°7 and that management has failed to
bargain in good faith. 2 8 Employers in turn can charge that the
union has coerced the rights of individual employees,20 9 that the
union has engaged in illegal economic activities, 2 10 and that the
union has refused to fulfill its bargaining duties. 21' All such
charges are to be lodged before the NLRB.2 1 z If the General
Counsel finds probable cause, then a hearing is first held before
an administrative law judge, with appeal rights then to the Board
itself and subsequently to a federal court of appeals. 213 The process is cumbersome, expensive, and lengthy.
In contrast, under the RLA, employers or employees with similar complaints generally only file grievances. Those grievances,
Id.
For example, in
ing industry was 11.3,
per 10,000 employees.
205 29 U.S.C. § 158
206 Id. § 158(a)(1).
207 Id. § 158(a)(2).
208 Id. § 158(a)(5).
209 Id. § 158(b)(1).
210 Id. § 158(b)(4).
211 Id. § 158(b)(3).
212 Id. § 159(9).
213 Id. § 160.
203

204

1997 the number of ULPs per 10,000 employees in the truckwhile for postal employees the number was thirty-nine ULPs
See NAT'L LABOR RELA-riONs BD., ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
(1994).
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as long as minor, are then subject to mediation.2 1 4 No route to
an administrative adjudicator or to the federal courts is contemplated. 21 5 The NMB has no quasi-judicial authority comparable
to the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the NLRB. The structure of the statutes thus invites far greater incidence of litigation
under the NLRA, and in this respect the PRA is structured
similarly.
Commentators concur that litigation of unfair labor practice
216
issues is far more costly than resort to the grievance system.
Proceedings are more formalized in litigation, and the need for
outside counsel is greater.2 1 7 Witnesses must be prepared, and
briefs must be written.2 1 8 Moreover, with each additional stage
in the administrative process, additional resources must be
invested.2 1 9
Thus, under the NLRA litigation can occur through arbitration
and ULP charges. Under the RLA, arbitration is the most likely
avenue to challenge contract violations, and it is subject to fairly
limited possibility of judicial review.
One way of quantifying the effect of the different regulatory
structures is by considering the length of time that it takes to
resolve disputes under either regime. In terms of grievance arbitration, the average time in 1997 between the date the grievance
was filed and the date of an award was about 311 days. 220 This
delay will be experienced under both statutes, because grievance
arbitration exists under both. However, under the NLRA, charging parties also have the avenue of filing an ULP. The protracted
214 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151.
215 Id.
216

See LAURA J. COOPER

ET AL.,

ADR

IN THE WORKPLACE:

A COURSEBOOK

500-02 (2000) (comparing the costs of arbitration and litigation in a judicial forum).
The NLRB may defer to the grievance procedure if the contractual procedure is
capable of adequately solving the dispute.

In re Collyer Insulated Wire, 192

N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). This practice will tend to reduce the costs of enforcing statutory rights.
217 See COOPER ET AL., supra note 216, at 500-02.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 These figures are taken from the 1997 Annual Report of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, and thus they do not include arbitration procedures under
the RLA. Anecdotal experience suggests that the resolution of grievances takes
substantially longer under the RLA than under the NLRA. Some commentators
indicate than on average it takes years to resolve grievances that are submitted to
one of the boards. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 475. There does not appear to
be, however, any verifiable data on this regard.
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delay in utilizing the required stages for processing an unfair labor practice charge builds in another layer of costs. In 1997, the
median period required to process a case from filing the charge
to issuance of the Board's order was 557 days. In addition, an
enforcement action or an appeal of a Board's order could take an
additional one or two years.2 21
To be sure, employers might welcome these added costs because the NLRA's cumbersome machinery for addressing organizational disputes permits widespread employer flouting or at
least aggressive challenging of organization rights.2 22 Delay diminishes the employees' interest in efficacious resolution of organizational disputes.2 23 Nonetheless, although at times employers
might invite the greater costs of the multi-tiered review process
under the NLRA, the fact remains that the statute itself envisions and embraces this costly process.
Furthermore, not only are there more routes to litigation
under the NLRA and PRA, but also there is greater likelihood
that more disputes will arise because the two statutes rely on
standard-like distinctions in setting the parameters for the employer-employee relationship. The contentiousness can be most
clearly observed in two key areas: mandatory topics for bargaining, and organizational rights.
By creating a distinction between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining, the NLRA and PRA engender considerable disputes that, until recently, have not been present under the
RLA. The NLRA and PRA impose on employers and unions a
duty to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." However, courts have limited the scope
of this duty by developing a distinction between mandatory subjects of bargaining. For instance, in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB ,224 the Supreme Court held that a company has
no duty to bargain over a decision to close a part of its business.
In contrast, under the RLA "[t]he scope of bargainability is
extremely broad. '2 25 Courts have found that the RLA imposes a
221 See Morris, supra note 79, at 338.
222 See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1772-73 (1983) (discussing the

strategic use by employers of the NLRA).
223 Id.
224 452 U.S. 666 (1980).

225 Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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duty to bargain over all issues regarding "rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions. ' 226 This means that any issue affecting employees is subject to the bargaining and impasse procedures of
section 6 if either side wishes to bargain. Because the scope of
bargaining under the RLA has been interpreted to be plenary,
the scope of the employer's bargaining duty has not given rise to
significant litigation. 227 The rule-like way in which the Court has
construed the RLA minimizes the potential for disputes.
In short, given the broad mandate in the RLA to bargain over
every issue, litigation over the employer's duty to bargain has
been kept to a minimum. Accordingly, litigation costs under the
RLA should be lower.
In addition to the distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects, the NLRA and PRA contain more detailed procedures than the RLA for election unit definition and
selection of the employee bargaining agent. 228 This structure
permits the NLRB more involvement in the regulation, investigation, and adjudication of recognition problems.2 29
No comparable process exists under the RLA. The duties and
prohibitions that govern conduct under the RLA are enforced in
the federal courts through suits brought directly by unions, employees, or carriers." 3
Although this direct access to courts might at first blush appear
to open the way to greater litigation, in practice the opposite has
proven true. The availability of relatively quick injunctive relief-albeit pursuant to traditional equitable criteria applicable
to most preliminary injunctions in the federal courts-has had
such a strong deterrent effect on carrier conduct that discriminatory discharges to discourage unionization rarely occur under the
RLA.
In a recent study, Professor Charles Morris evaluated the enforcement history of the regulatory regimes protecting employees' organizational rights.23 1 Professor Morris found that, since
226 See Stone, supra note 102, at 1527.
227 Id.
228 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
229 Id.
230 Employees have primarily relied on the injunctive power of the federal district
courts to enforce statutory rights under the RLA. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); see also Morris, supra note 79,
at 335.
231 Id.
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1926 when the RLA was enacted, there have been only fifteen
published court cases involving issues of employee discharge for
union activity. In fact, it has been more than ten years since a
court decision has been published in this area.23 2
In contrast, litigation concerning employee discharge for organizing activity is a common occurrence under the NLRA. In
1997 alone there were a total of 13,127 charges involving section
8(a)(3).23 3 It is generally accepted that most of the section 8(a)(3)
incidents represent discharges that occurred in relation to union
organizational activity. And, all such decisions are subject to judicial review.
The RLA's method in dealing with representation disputes is
reinforced by the manner in which the RLA deals with the bargaining unit question. 3 4 The different approaches the three statutes use in defining the bargaining unit impose additional
organization costs. Because of the rule-like nature of the RLA's
endorsement of craft-wide units, far fewer litigable questions
arise.23 5
In comparison, the NLRA and the PRA provide for the organization of employees in "a unit appropriate" for the purposes of
collective bargaining.2 36 Unlike the NMB, the NLRB has substantial discretion to determine the "appropriateness" of a
unit.2 3 ' As discussed above, the primary focus in determining an
appropriate bargaining unit under the NLRA and the PRA is
that employees with a community of interest should be grouped
together.23 ' The NLRB inquires into a number of factors to test
the community of interest: extent and type of union organization; bargaining history for the employees involved in the particular industry at issue; similarity of duties, skills, interests, and
working conditions; structure of the company; and employee
desires.2 3 9 These fact-bound questions inject uncertainty into the
bargaining unit determinations, and present additional fodder for
litigation.
Despite the high degree of unionization in both the railroad
232 Arcamuzi v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1987).
233 See Morris, supra note 79, at 322 tbl.1.

234 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
235 See Eischen, supra note 40, at 32-34.

236 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
237 Id.

238 Id.
239 Id.
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and airline industries, during the last three decades the NMB has
decided only about fifty cases per year involving representation
matters.2 40 A majority of these cases have been in the airline
industry, and have involved issues such as mergers and union
raiding, as opposed to an active use of litigation as an organizing
24 1
strategy.
In contrast, the NLRA's more context-specific "community of
interest" standard reflects its statutory goal of championing employee voice. This approach, however, has generated some unanticipated consequences. In defining bargaining units so narrowly,
the NLRB consciously or unconsciously has sown the seeds for
greater litigation both because employees and employers will
more likely disagree about the appropriate scope of the bargaining unit, and also because the majority favoring representation in
each unit is more unstable. 42
Although direct comparisons between industries covered by
the RLA and the NLRA is difficult, the incidence of litigation in
each group of industries can be roughly measured by comparing
the number of representation cases per employee in industries
covered under the RLA and the trucking industry covered under
the NLRA. In 1980, for example, representation cases per employee in the trucking industry occurred at a rate of 7.1 cases per
10,000 employees. 24 3 Under the RLA, the incidence was smaller,
with a rate of 1.3 cases per 10,000 employees in 1978.244 This
trend appears to have continued in recent years. In 1997, representation cases per employee in the trucking industry was 2.3
cases per 10,000 employees, while the incidence under the RLA
was less than one case (0.9) per 10,000 employees.24 5
Despite the fact that the approach concerning bargaining units
under the PRA is the same as that under the NLRA, the experience under the PRA parallels that under the RLA. For example,
in 1997 no cases were filed concerning representation rights for
postal workers. 246 This might be due to the fact that, as a heavily
See Northrup, supra note 68, at 479.
Id.
242 In 1990, the NLRB for the first time since its creation promulgated a substantive rule defining the employee units appropriate for collective bargaining in a particular line of commerce: acute care hospitals. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1990).
243 See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151.
240

241

244

Id,

The figures are calculated using the annual reports of the NLRB and NMB for
the respective years.
246 See NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 204.
245
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unionized industry, we should expect to see decreasing organizing activity. Alternatively, public sector employer resistance to
organizing rights may have waned, minimizing conflict over representation rights.
3.

Administration of Grievance Machinery

Despite the fact that more litigable issues arise under the
NLRA than under the RLA, greater utilization of the grievance
machinery under the RLA might blunt the cost savings from less
litigation, particularly if one considers the possibility of a much
more lengthy grievance process under the RLA. Thus, in comparing the two statutes is important to consider whether the
greater accessibility to a grievance process (as is the case under
the RLA) results in an "inefficient" increase in the use of the
grievance process. There is evidence suggesting that the grievance machinery in the railroad industry is comparatively inefficient. Overall, however, there is little reason to conclude that the
RLA's preference for grievance resolution over litigation imposes enough costs on employers to come anywhere close to negating the RLA's substantial advantage in minimizing litigation
costs.
First, even though there are incentives for the parties to
"abuse" the arbitration machinery, and the mechanisms to resolve grievances under the RLA (NRAB, SBAs, and PLBs) have
been criticized for being inefficient, there is no indication, at least
in recent years, that the rate of grievance filing under the RLA is
significantly different than that of other industries. From 1993 to
1995, the number of grievances submitted to arbitration in the
railroad industry average 1.7, 1.99, and 2.02 per 100 employees,
respectively. A study of 1980-1982 grievance activity across several private and public organizations found the comparable number to be 1.1 per 100 employees.2 4 7
Second, the grievance process utilized by the rail industry is
entirely publicly financed.2 48 This means that employers and unions do not bear the costs associated with establishing the dispute
resolution machinery.2 4 9
247 See generally DAVID LEWIN AND R.B. PETERSON, THE MODERN GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).

248 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
249 As described earlier, the grievance process in the airline industry is financed
by the parties themselves. Thus, while the cost savings will be smaller, resort to the
grievance process will be more sporadic.
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Third, grievances under the RLA are rarely subject to judicial
review.2 5 ° Under the RLA arbitration boards have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes. 2 51 Awards are considered to
be final and binding, leaving courts with only a limited role in the
RLA arbitration process. 2 The RLA restricts judicial review to
four narrow grounds: failure of the Board to comply with the
requirements of the RLA, failure of the Board to conform or
confine itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction, fraud
or corruption by a member of the Board, and violations of public
policy.2 53 This limited role of judicial review, which parallels that
adopted under the NLRA, should at least reduce the possible
costs associated with grievance handling to the extent that it increases the finality of the grievance process. 4
In sum, resolving grievances is far from cost free. Arguably,
the costs incurred under the RLA in resolving grievances are
smaller than the savings in litigation costs, particularly for nonunionized firms. Each grievance is far less expensive to resolve,
and most are resolved short of arbitration. Moreover, the airline
industry has streamlined the process more than in the railroad
industry, heightening the disparity in costs between disputes in
that industry and under the NLRA.
C. Labor Relations Costs
Another dimension over which the three regulatory regimes
could be compared are the constraints placed on the ability of
employers to operate their businesses. Two aspects of what I referred to as labor relations costs are considered: the effects of
organizing rights and cost implications regarding bargaining
duties.
1.

OrganizationalIssues

As discussed earlier, the RLA, NLRA, and PRA differ in
terms of their policies concerning organizing rights. Such differ250 See Javits, supra note 118, at 394.
251 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
252 See Javits, supra note 118, at 394.
253 See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,

1988).

861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir.

254 In addition, because of the use of larger, carrier-wide bargaining units under
the RLA, an employer can bargain for efficiencies in the grievance arbitration process that cannot be attained under the NLRA, given the use of smaller bargaining
units.
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ences result in a greater propensity to litigate organizational
rights under the NLRA than under the RLA, thereby increasing
litigation costs under the NLRA. Regulation regarding two
other specific aspects of organizational rights-bargaining unit
definition and election rules-may impose differential costs on
employers depending on whether the RLA or NLRA applies.
A key difference underlying both statutes with respect to organizational rights is the definition of the bargaining unit. Under
the RLA, carrier-wide units of a craft or class have been found to
be appropriate. This means that a union would have to obtain
authorization cards from thirty-five percent of all employees in a
"class" or "craft" (e.g., office and clerical employees) to obtain
an election, and over fifty percent to obtain recognition.2 5 5
Under the NLRA, a union can seek to represent employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, which has been normally defined as
a single location unit.25 6
There are several cost implications because of this difference.
First, a carrier-wide bargaining unit should make it, in theory,
more difficult for unions to organize, because the union will have
to get the support of a group of employees dispersed over a wide
geographical area. 7 This should make it easier for an employer
under the RLA to oppose unionization, and in that sense decrease the costs of opposing a labor organization's organizing
drive.
In practice, however, it is not clear that these possible economies have been realized. For example, as noted earlier, union
density rates under the RLA exceed those under the NLRA by a
significant amount, and while union density in the private sector
has generally been declining, in the industries covered by the
RLA it has actually been increasing. 8 Similarly, the carrier255 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
256 Id.
257 See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. ScoTrr, ORGANIZING AND THE

LAw 204-06 (1983) (discussing the strategic considerations of the bargaining unit
determination).
258 As compared to unionization rates in the United States as a whole, unionization rates in the railroad and airline industries have remained unusually strong. See
Morris, supra note 79, at 319-20. From 1955 to the 1990s the percent of non-agricultural workers represented by labor organizations has dropped from thirty-three percent to its present level of about 14.1%. Id. In industries covered by the RLA,
however, between eighty percent and eighty-five percent of railroad employees were
represented by unions in 1996, and sixty-five percent to seventy percent for employees of the scheduled airlines in 1997. Id. Thus, union density in the industries covered by the RLA actually has been increasing. Id.
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wide approach to the bargaining unit definition is accompanied,
as discussed earlier, by the willingness of courts to issue injunctions against employers that interfere with the organizational
rights of employees. 259 Another cost implication of the carrierwide approach relates not to organizing per se, but to the effect
that bargaining unit determination has on bargaining power.2 6 °
While a larger, carrier-wide unit is more difficult to organize,
once in place it could potentially exercise more bargaining power
and be more difficult to decertify. Facing a carrier-wide unit, employers would lose some of their ability to isolate labor disputes
to particular locales or geographical area. 261 Further, a work
stoppage in a carrier-wide unit could potentially signify the closing of operations for the whole enterprise.2 6 2
The rules regarding election issues also result in different costs
under each of the three regimes. As described above,2 63 the
NMB has utilized different election procedures than has the
NLRB, such as the different kind of election ballots (NMB's ballot does not include a "no union") and the NMB's minimum
voter participation requirements. The NLRB and the NMB have
of ballots
also differed in their philosophy towards modifications
264
process.
election
the
of
violations
remedy
to
The cost implications of the different approaches to elections
are somewhat complex. On the one hand, the requirement that a
majority of employees vote in favor of a union before granting
recognition should make it less likely for a union to be certified
under the RLA, since a no-show counts as a vote against the
union. On the other hand the willingness of the NMB to use
different ballots as an instrument to remedy employers' attempts
to interfere with their employees' organizational rights appears
to expand the set of protections available to employees as compared to the NLRA.
In short, there is no a priori way to determine whether the
RLA or NLRA imposes greater costs on employers due to their
different election procedures. To some extent, at least, the RLA
as a theoretical manner makes it more difficult for employees to
259 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
260 See SCHLOSSBERG & Scor, supra note 257, at 204-06.
261

Id.

Id.
263 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
262

264 Id.
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elect union representation, but the NMB has stepped into the
fray to ease such burdens.
2. Bargaining Costs
In opposition to the RLA's advantage in minimizing litigation
costs, bargaining costs under the RLA are steeper. The regulatory structure affects bargaining costs at two different levels.
First, the RLA embraces a broader scope of bargaining, imposing
on employers a duty to bargain over a broader set of issues as
compared to the NLRA. Second, the RLA also provides incentives for protracted bargaining, which not only increases labor
relations costs, but perhaps more importantly, serves to prevent
the employer from efficiently adopting changes in the workplace.
This section discusses these two issues.
a. Effect on Managerial Prerogatives
Although difficult to quantify, one of the most critical costs of
any labor-management regulatory regime is the impact on employer flexibility. 265 A firm that cannot respond to market opportunities or changes cannot thrive.26 6 Competitive pressures,
technological changes, and unexpected shifts in consumer demand all prompt the need for quick response.2 6 7 Such responses
take many forms, but may include abandoning certain product
lines, closing outmoded plants, contracting out particular functions, or moving tasks offshore. 268 Although the gap between the
NLRA and RLA in this respect may be narrowing-as we mentioned previously-the NLRA acknowledges and preserves firm
flexibility to a far greater extent.
Firms under the NLRA must bargain over mandatory subjects
such as wages and hours, but not over managerial prerogatives. 269 The First National Maintenance Corp.270 decision, and
its progeny, carved out from the statutory obligation any bargaining proposal covering such strategic decisions as plant closing or
building new plants overseas. Thus, unions may propose terms
265 See generally LABOR

LAW AND

BUSINESS

CHANCE:

THEORETICAL

AND

TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988)

(developing a model of the duty to bargain under the NLRA).
266

Id.

267

Id.

268 Id.

269 See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
270 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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covering such items, but the employer need not agree to bargain
over such proposals, and unions cannot take any protected legal
action to protest the employer's intransigence.
In contrast, the RLA has not limited the employer's duty to
bargain.2 7 1 Consequently, unions may propose limitations on the
employer's right to contract out, to hire foreign nationals, to
close particular plants, and to bargain about the effects of such
decisions.2 72 In cases where the employer refuses to accede to
the union's demands, the dispute may ultimately be resolved 273
by
an arbitrator. The threat to employer autonomy is apparent.
Moreover, an employer under the RLA may not take unilateral action on any major dispute during the pendency of a contract. 4 Thus, the employer must afford thirty days notice and
bargain to impasse if the union challenges an economic decision
as inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement during the period covered by the agreement. And, the employer at a minimum-as addressed earlier-must bargain over
the effects of all such decisions.
To a financially powerful company, the prospect of bargaining
over employer prerogatives may not prove that problematic for a
number of reasons. First, if the union has little strength, the potential for bargaining over employer prerogatives may pose little
risk because the union's threats are empty.2 75 Unions will not be
able to leverage that capacity to accomplish any significant material gains. Even a weak union, however, can interfere with management prerogatives through the ability under the RLA to
delay the implementation of new policies.
Second, if a firm is in a relatively strong financial position, a
company may predict that it will not need to revamp its operations so as to necessitate a quick sale or retooling of any of its
plants.2 7 6 Bargaining over employer prerogatives, and agreeing
to limit the firm's discretion, would therefore cause little harm.
Third, a company may believe that it is in the position to allay
271 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.

275 See KOCHAN & KATZ, supra note 201, at 53-56 (discussing the concept of bar-

gaining power and its effects on the collective bargaining process).
276 See David Lewin, Industrial Relations as a Strategic Variable, in HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE FIRM PERFORMANCE 1, 16-22 (Morris M. Kleiner et al. eds., 1987)

(describing the strategic implications of collective bargaining).
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the union's interest on such strategic matters by offering significant material benefits in terms of enhanced pay or working conditions.27 7 A collective bargaining agreement that insulates the
company from union challenges over employer prerogatives may
suffice. Even there, however, the company may have to promise
more in the way of such benefits than it would have otherwise.
Fourth, a company may be confident that the union will not be
able to use the arbitral machinery under the Act to impact its
strategic decisions materially. It may forecast that arbitrators or
courts will be sympathetic to any carefully defended employer
claim that dispatch was essential to protect itself in the
marketplace.
On balance, the dichotomy under the NLRA between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining advantages employers
substantially. Most employers recognize that market conditions
may suddenly alter to the point where they must change their
operations quickly and significantly to avoid precipitous loss in
market share. Firms may "pay" unions more to preserve their
prerogatives under the RLA. Thus, because the RLA saps the
employer's ability to react quickly, employers should strongly
prefer regulation under the NLRA in this respect.
ProtractedBargaining

b.

Although the RLA, NLRA, and PRA all rely on collective
bargaining as the core mechanism to regulate industrial conflict,
the statutes are significantly different in terms of the incentives
they create for parties to negotiate. The RLA embodies a conception of labor relations in which all existing conditions and
practices are presumed to be the product of agreements between
management and labor.2 78
The RLA requires parties to exhaust the Act's dispute procedures before they exercise economic action.2 79 Thus, the RLA
forces labor and management to maintain the status quo for indeterminate periods regardless of their wishes.28 ° The NMB controls the timing of strike threats by determining when the
prospects for successful mediation have been exhausted. 281 The
277 See PAULA B. VOOS, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE

278
279
280
281

SECTOR 4-6 (1994) (describing productivity enhancing bargaining).
See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.

Id.
Id.
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Board often uses this power to coordinate strike dates for different bargaining units, thus exercising significant power over bargaining structure.
The RLA's preference for the outcomes of collective bargaining in turn induces a "narcotic effect" which tends to protract
collective bargaining negotiations even further.283 If the parties
are unable to settle a dispute by collective bargaining, either
party may seek mediation by the NMB, or the Board "may proffer its services in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist
at any time. ' 28 4 Because the Act requires that the status quo
remain in force until the Board releases the parties to unilateral
action, the Board becomes involved in disputes that are not directly settled by the parties themselves and for which one of the
parties finds soliciting intervention advantageous. 8 5
In contrast to the RLA, the NLRA allows economic pressure
to play a much larger role in the bargaining process.28 6 Once
parties have complied with their duty to bargain in good faith, a
union is free to strike and an employer is free to institute unilateral changes in working conditions.28 7 As described earlier, only
under very specific conditions would the government intervene
to delay or stop self-help actions by the parties to the collective
bargaining process. 88
Given that public employees do not enjoy a right to strike, the
PRA provides for mediation and arbitration of interest disputes. 28 9 The PRA provides for fact-finding procedures by the
FMCS whenever the parties fail to reach an agreement or to
adopt a procedure for binding resolution by the expiration of the
agreement. 290 The fact-finding panel is required to issue a report, with or without recommendations. 291 Finally, the PRA
goes further than either the NLRA or RLA by providing for
282 Id.

283 The "narcotic effect" phenomenon has been discussed in the context of the
arbitration process to identify the tendency of the parties to an arbitration process to
rely on the arbitrator's decision instead of engaging in serious negotiations. See
KOCHAN & KATZ, supra note 201, at 280-81.

284 45 U.S.C. § 155 para. 1 (1994).
285 See Northrup, supra note 68, at 469.
286 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
287 Id.
288 See supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 170-88 and accompanying text.
290 Id.

291 Id.
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impasse persists for 180 days
binding arbitration if the bargaining
292
from the start of negotiations.
In summary, parties negotiating under the RLA should expect
to face longer and more frequent negotiations. Negotiations are
prolonged as the parties go through mediation, the appointment
of emergency boards, and the so-called "narcotic effect." Knowing that mediation, and to some extent emergency boards, are
fairly likely occurrences in the bargaining process, labor and
management are less likely to take negotiations seriously until
those steps have occurred. Moreover, labor and management
under the RLA have less control over the negotiations, in terms
of both their abilities to exert economic pressure on the opposing
side and in the conduct of negotiations. The diminished ability to
exert economic pressure results from the obligation to maintain
the status quo during the course of negotiations and from the
greater level of government intervention through mediation. A
similar problem could occur under the PRA. Reliance on factfinding and arbitration appears to have become a common occurrence in postal negotiations under the PRA.
These extra costs in terms of prolonged bargaining sessions
and withheld desired changes in the workplace are possibly balanced by the major statutory achievement of the RLA and the
PRA: a much greater certainty of labor peace. Thus, while the
parties face some increasing costs under the RLA and the PRA,
they also enjoy an increasing certainty that bargaining disputes
will not be the subject of economic pressure.
Whether this tradeoff is, ex ante, more beneficial to labor or
management depends on a number of other factors such as bargaining power and business conditions. For example, an employer who is subject to significant cyclical variations in the
demand for its product might find it extremely detrimental to
maintain the status quo during the course of the various steps
preceding the availability of self-help under the RLA. By the
time negotiations end, the effect of the inability to respond to the
change in demand might prove to be overly burdensome. On
balance, therefore, protracted bargaining under the RLA likely
disadvantages employers.

292 Id.
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D. Regulation of Work Stoppages
Strikes are far more likely under the NLRA than under the
RLA. As discussed previously, the cooling off mechanisms imposed under the RLA, as well as the mediation mandate, makes
the prospect of a strike far more remote.29 3 Employees can
strike only after exhausting the mediation provisions in the Act,
and if a major dispute, only after the protracted and politically
intense mechanism of the Presidential emergency boards have
been utilized.2 94 The constraints the RLA imposes on the ability
to strike is likely to result in a much lower number of strikes in
the railroad and airline industries as compared to industries covered under the NLRA.2 95 While data on the railroad industry is
unavailable, it is possible to compare strike activity in the airline
industry, to strike activity in non-RLA industries. The data is
suggestive of a much smaller level of strike activity in the airline
industry under the RLA, even after considering the overall decline of strike activity throughout the economy.2 96 There is no
293 See
294 Id.
295

supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.

Percent of Working Time Lost to Strikes in the Airline
Industry and in Non-RLA Industries

Year

Percent of Working
Time Lost to Strikes
in Airline Industry

Percent of Working
Time Lost to Strikes in
Non-RLA Industries

0.08
0.003
1983
0.04
1984
0
0.03
1985
0.0002
0.05
1986
0.00006
0.02
1987
0
0.02
0.0006
1988
0.07
0
1989
0.02
0
1990
0.02
0
1991
0.01
0.000003
1992
0.01
0.000003
1993
0.02
0
1994
0.02
1995
0
The "Percent of Working Time Lost to Strikes in Airline Industry" were calculated using figures taken from the Annual Report of the National Mediation Board.
Data for 1970-1976 are for fiscal years running from July 1 to June 30. Data for
1977-1992 are for fiscal years running from October 1 to September 30. The "Percent of Working Time Lost to Strikes in Non-RLA Industries" was calculated using
figures taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States in 1997.
296 This conclusion is consistent with the results of a 1976 study comparing the
proportion of total working time lost through strikes across industries for the period
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reason to think that figures for the railroad industry would be
materially different. One reason for the lower level of activity
may be the NMB's greater involvement in interest disputes. The
NMB's virtually unreviewable discretion as to when a carrier and
union should be "released" from mediation, and therefore entitled to strike, is virtually unreviewable by the courts. 297 This
means that the NMB, encouraged by one or both parties, or
merely informed by its own industrial relations expertise, can alter the bargaining process.
Moreover, employers under the RLA, as discussed previously,
are more likely to benefit from the emergency strike provisions.
If the statutory threshold under the RLA is met, then mediation
and government intervention diminish the prospect of a strike.29 8
Although from the employer's perspective, the RLA appears
to provide a broader protection against work stoppages, there is
one potential wild card: work stoppages related to secondary
pressure. Secondary pressure has been essentially prohibited
under the NLRA, but largely is available to unions under the
RLA.
In Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Company,299 the Supreme Court held that under the RLA once
the parties have exhausted the procedures for major disputes resolution, they can "employ the full range of whatever peaceful ecbetween 1956 and 1972, which found that the percentage of working time lost
through strikes averaged 0.21 in the railroad industry and 0.60 in the airline industry.
These numbers compared favorably to an average of 0.84 for the four most heavily
unionized industries under the NLRA. See Donald E. Cullen, Strike Experience
Under the Railway Labor Act, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FiFrY 187, 201

(Charles Rehmus ed., 1977).
297 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 930
F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting union petition to compel NMB to release
union from mediation after fourteen months and noting the narrow standard of review of NMB decisions).
298 The difference in the two statutes' triggering mechanisms, however, should not
be overstated. It is important to understand that the framework for addressing
emergency strikes under a statute is a mixture of law and politics. What the statute
says about the criteria for government intervention in an emergency strike is merely
the starting point. Whether the president appoints a board of inquiry under the
Taft-Hartley Act or appoints an emergency board under the Railway Labor Act is a
political decision. Even when the President appoints a board under either Act, this
only delays the right to strike; it does not eliminate it altogether, and it does not
ensure a settlement of the dispute. If the dispute is not settled voluntarily under the
emergency board or board of inquiry, the matter reverts to Congress. Whether Congress acts to impose a settlement is a purely political decision.
299 394 U.S. 369, 384-85 (1945).
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onomic power they can muster . . . whether characterized as
primary or secondary. ' 30 The Court has continued to adhere to
this policy, rejecting carriers' arguments that "allow[ing] unions
to resort to secondary activity is ... inconsistent with the major
purpose of the RLA" to prevent strikes and interruptions to
commerce." 1 According to the Court, although the primary goal
of the RLA is to settle strikes and to avoid interruptions to commerce, there is no indication that Congress intended under the
RLA to permit federal courts to enjoin secondary activity as a
means towards that end.30 2 Thus, the Court accordingly has allowed unions to picket the facilities of secondary carriers and to
ask other carriers' employees to withdraw from service.30 3 The
Court has treated secondary pressure in airline disputes under
the same standard.30 4
Under the NLRA, a union having a dispute with an employer
must confine its picketing activity to that particular employer.
The NLRA prohibits unions from extending the labor dispute to
other employers in the hope that pressuring them to cease dealing with the primary employer will facilitate achieving a victory
against the primary employer.30 5 The provision against secondary activity is enforced both through injunctions and awards of
monetary damages.3
The RLA thus provides unions with a larger set of weapons to
exert economic pressure on the employer outside of the strike
context. These weapons, however, are available to the union after a much longer period of negotiations. The NLRA, on the
other hand, allows the parties to resort to self-help much more
quickly, but limits the kind of tools available to unions to exert
pressure on the employer. In assessing the costs associated with
these two regimes, employers should calculate the probability of
a strike occurring under either regime, times the probability of
harm caused by the union's economic tools (NLRA-limited to
primary activity; RLA-primary plus secondary activity).
300 Id. at 392-93.
301 Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 451
(1987).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 433.
304 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426,
442 (1989).
305 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994).
306 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1994).
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E.

Summary

Regulatory structures impose costs, and the labor relations regimes covering the express industry are no exception. This section has identified the differing costs under the three regimes
arising from litigation, the impact on administering labor-management relations, and the regulation of work stoppages. The
chart below summarizes this discussion.
Table 1
Cost Comparison of the RLA, NLRA and PRA
RLA
Litigation Costs
Likelihood of Employee
Organization
Obstacles to Decertification
Impact on Management
Prerogatives
Impact on Management Flexibility
Cost of Administering Statute
Risk of Government Meddling in
Contract Negotiations
Risk of Government Meddling in
Contract Administration
Risk of Strike

NLRA

PRA

Low
High

High
Medium

Medium
Medium

High
High

Medium
Low

High
Low

High
Medium
High

Low
High
Low

Low
High
High

High

Low

Low

Medium

High

Low

Two aspects appear to make the PRA framework the most attractive for employers. First, employers are immunized from
strikes, which in most employers' eyes presents an advantage
outweighing all other costs involved. The PRA substitutes binding interest arbitration for the right to strike.30 7 Moreover, the
PRA relieves employers of the duty to bargain over the direction
and nature of an employer's business. Companies preserve the
flexibility to implement change immediately, avoiding the delay
attendant upon protracted bargaining.
The comparative cost analysis between the RLA and NLRA is
closer, and companies might make different selections depending
upon their position in the industry. The RLA promises greater
307 Private sector entities, however, have never been governed by permanent legislation that takes away the right to strike and substitutes interest arbitration. The
formula has been used in ad-hoc congressional legislation for railroad and airline
disputes occasionally, but the probability that a private entity, even one conducting
service as critical as package express service supporting e-commerce, could persuade
Congress to enact permanent legislation along the lines of the PRA is extremely
low.
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security because employees can only take unilateral action after
the lengthy mediation process of the Act has been exhausted. In
addition, the RLA offers certain efficiencies by embracing craftwide bargaining units. Finally, disputes under the Act are less
likely to result in costly litigation. Requirements under the Act
are formulated more as rules than standards, minimizing the opportunity for discord, which reinforces the culture of mediation
underlying the Act.
On the other hand, the security and efficiency come at a
price-fewer managerial prerogatives are guaranteed. Firms
under the RLA must bargain about all conceivable issues even if
directly linked to business judgment. Nor can firms take unilateral steps to protect their financial interests in a rapidly changing
economic environment. And, the heavy hand of agency
mediators may constrain management even further.
IV
IMPLICATIONS

The analysis presented so far has significant implications for
the express package delivery industry, which as described earlier,3" 8 is directly affected by this state of affairs. The analysis
also has broader implications.
A.

Implications for the Express Package Delivery Industry

The analysis developed above raises serious concerns regarding the existing labor regulatory framework that applies to the
express package delivery industry. Market competition within
the same industry should not be skewed by differential costs imposed by labor-relations regimes. All firms should compete on
as level a playing field as possible. Irrespective of the arguable
advantages of one regime over the others, firms that provide the
same service within the express industry should not be forced
into different regulatory modes.
For instance, if strikes pose the greatest threat to market share,
there is no sound reason to protect some competitors but not
others from the risk. Governmental regulation otherwise would
favor certain firms over others, compromising the norm of evenhanded regulation. Similarly, comparable burdens of litigation
costs should be imposed on all competitors. And, if one firm
308

See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
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must bargain over its exercises of managerial prerogatives, so
should all.
This distinction is of extreme importance to members of the
express delivery industry. With the exception of the United
States Postal Service, which clearly falls under the Postal Reorganization Act,3 09 every major firm in the industry has litigated
the coverage issue.3"' Invariably, the disputed issue has been
whether a group of employees that seek union representation
under the NLRA, are "employees" under the RLA and thus
outside the coverage of the NLRA. 31 a
These cases are troubling to industry members for a couple of
reasons. First, it is hard to discern what standard the NMB is
applying in these cases,3 12 and when would the NLRB defer to
309 39 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
310 Regarding UPS, see UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996) and In re
UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995). Regarding Federal Express, see In re Federal Express, 323 N.L.R.B. 871 (1997); In re Federal Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155
(1995); and In re Federal Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. 32 (1995). Regarding Airborne
Express, see In re ABX Air, Inc., 25 N.M.B. 274 (1998). Regarding DHL, see In re
DHL Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 17 (1982). Regarding Emery, see In re Emery Worldwide
Airlines, 28 N.M.B. 216 (2001) and In re Emery Worldwide Airlines, 27 N.M.B. 127
(1999).
311 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). The term employee is defined under the NLRA to
"include any employee ... , but shall not include ... any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act." Id.
312 In deciding whether a particular group of employees fall under the jurisdiction
of the RLA, the NMB has focused on a number of issues. In some cases the focus
has been on whether the employer is a "common carrier by air." ABX Air, 25
N.M.B. at 281-82; Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 70-71. The term "carrier" includes "any company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or under
common control with any carries ... and which operates any equipment or facilities
or performs any service (other than trucking service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit ... and handling of property
transported by railroad." 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). This language was originally applied only to railroads. 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1994) extended this provision to carriers by
air and their employees. In some cases, after having answered this question affirmatively, the NMB ends the inquiry and finds that the employees (whatever their job
duties) are employees under the RLA, and thus keeps jurisdiction over the case.
ABX Air, 25 N.M.B. at 283-84. In other cases, the NMB has inquired further into
whether the job duties of the employees are "integrally related" to the normal operations of the carrier. This further inquiry has taken the NMB into discussions regarding the specific job duties of the employees and how do those duties fit into the
overall operation of the firm. Federal Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 73-75; Emery
Worldwide Airlines, 28 N.M.B. at 237-40. For example, in a number of cases the
NMB has looked in detail the proportion of air to ground transportation used by the
carrier, finding that employees fall under the jurisdiction of the RLA where most of
transportation activity occurs by air. Federal Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 73-75.
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the NMB's judgment. 1 3 Second, to the extent that a legal standard can be defined, it imposes on industry members, as well as
employees, a fairly inflexible structure that affects their ability to
adapt to the specific situations presented by their respective
environments.3 1 4
Principles of competitive equality dictate that the government
should not force similarly situated firms into different regulatory
modes. The differential costs imposed sap the ability of each
firm to compete fairly in the marketplace. Although there might
have been, and continue to be some rationale to treat the transportation industry (in fact only the railroads and airlines) differently from the rest of the economy, there does not appear to be
any principled rationale to treat firms within the same industry,
and that provide an identical service differently. In short, the
government should take regulation out of the competitive
equation.
B.

A New Approach to Labor Law Reform

Heretofore, this article has focused on the justifiability of having Congress imposing differing costs on members of the same
industry by forcing them into distinct regulatory regimes. The
prior discussion articulates what those cost differences are, pointing out that they are non-trivial. The preceding section suggests
that notions of fairness require a revision to the various statutory
frameworks to correct this discrepancy.
In this section I turn this question on its head. Instead of inquiring as to appropriateness of subjecting firms within the same
industry to different labor relations regimes, I ask whether it will
be proper for Congress to present the targets of regulation with a
set of regulatory alternatives and let those affected by the regulation choose the regulatory framework that best fits their situation. The analysis here transcends the express delivery industry,
and seeks to identify the contours of such a scheme.
The analysis of the express package delivery industry demon313 Compare UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the NLRB

was not required to refer issue of its jurisdiction over trucking corporation to the
NMB), with In re Fed. Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155 (1995) (deferring to the
NMB).
314 Both the NMB and the NLRB have been reluctant to reconsider the status of
employees of both UPS and Federal Express making strong references to their prior
decisions. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 34 (1995) (stating that the
Board repeatedly exercised jurisdiction over Federal Express).
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strates that at any time, any one regulatory regime is likely to fail
to address the relevant concerns of those who are covered under
the regulation.3 1 5 Changes in technology, labor trends, and market conditions occur too quickly and with enough frequency, that
not even the most efficient legislature is able to keep pace. Political sensitivities also make it difficult for Congress to enact legislation, exacerbating even more the problem of regulatory misfit.
Despite these concerns, the traditional regulatory mode, at
both the federal and state levels, has been to adopt one statutory
framework that governs all members in an industry.31 6 As an alternative, this article will suggest that instead of adopting one
regulatory regime which is intended to cover every employer in a
particular industry, Congress should adopt a menu of alternative
rules regarding the regulation of the labor relations process, and
let the stakeholders choose a set of rules that will govern their
employment relationship. Congress could adopt some general
principles regarding labor relations, akin to the current Section 7
of the NLRA which guarantees the right of individuals to choose
to join or not to join and assist a labor organization.31 7 Congress
will then adopt (either directly or through the agency) a menu of
alternative rules that the parties can then adopt on their own.
The menu of rules adopted by Congress should be detailed
enough, as to include regulations on the various components of
the labor relations process: organizing, contract negotiations and
contract administration. For example, Congress could adopt a
set of rules regarding organizing, as now available under the
three statutes, or create an entirely new set of choices. From the
NLRA, Congress could incorporate the alternative of an appropriate bargaining unit.3 18 From the RLA, Congress could incorporate the option of bargaining units defined by craft or class
lines.3 19 Another set of options could be provided regarding the
315 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law
and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001) (identifying the shortfalls of

traditional regulatory schemes in corporate takeover law); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51

(1992) (contrasting the advantages and disadvantages of a single bankruptcy regime
and a "choice" regime).
316 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45

UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-17 (1997) (describing the problems associated with traditional
regulatory schemes).
317 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
318 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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ability of parties to obtain injunctions in federal court to enforce
statutory rights, or to instead rely on administrative procedures. 320 Alternative rules will also be provided regarding issues
of contract negotiation and contract administration.
Following issuance of the menu of rules, it will be then necessary for individual firms to adopt a set of rules that will govern
their labor relations process. Obviously, at this point, and in the
absence of any representation by employees, employers will be
more likely to select a set of rules that result in the least interference with managerial rights as possible, and correspondingly, in
possible minimal protection of employees' rights.3 2 1 To avoid
this problem, Congress could mandate that the adoption of the
regulatory framework by the firm, be conducted with the input
from the employees to be affected by the choice of rules. If employees are currently represented by a labor organization, the
process will be relatively straightforward, the current union will
represent the employees in the negotiated rulemaking process.32 2
If the employees are not represented by a labor organization, the
employees could secure the advice of a labor union for these purposes, or for that matter, the advice of any other private group
(e.g., law firm, community group).
Once the selection of rules has been made, the employment
relationship will be governed by the terms agreed in the negotiated rulemaking process. In the absence of an agreement on an
alternative set of rules, the employment relationship will be regulated under the regulatory frameworks available under current
law. In a sense, the current regulatory frameworks will serve as a
default rule.
Thus in a sense, I am suggesting a two stage bargaining process, the first stage being negotiation over the legal framework
under which the parties are to operate and the second stage being negotiations over the terms and conditions of employment
(as presently done).
Although the rule-menu approach is radical as applied to the
320 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
321 See David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599,

625-30 (2000) (describing the strategic aspects of regulated rule-making).
322 See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 61-66 (1993) (describing the role that labor

unions could play under alternative forms of employee representation).
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regulation of labor relations, the idea of flexible regulation is
hardly new in administrative law literature. Over the last decade

there has been a significant amount of activity in the area of flexible regulation. 3 3 Flexible regulation refers to the use of collab-

orative regulatory approaches under which the firms, groups, and
individuals who are the subject of regulatory compulsion (stakeholders) engage in designing and enforcing of the rules that dictate their conduct. 324 The basic premise of flexible regulation is
that by empowering the stakeholders of regulation, society can
achieve more efficient regulatory outcomes. 325 A number of approaches have been adopted on an experimental basis, primarily
in the area of environmental regulation: negotiated rulemak6
and the Environmental Protection Agency's Project
ing, 32
327
XL.

Three basic problems have been identified in the development
of flexible regulation experiments: (1) the problem of adequate
323 See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) (describing
the flexible regulation experience).
324 Id. at 414-20.
325 Id

326 See Freeman, supra note 316, at 33-54. The objective of negotiated rulemaking is to get stakeholders involved in the rule-making process as early as possible in
the regulatory process. The process involves the appointment, by the appropriate
regulatory agency, of a rulemaking negotiating committee. The committee is supposed to include representatives of all the effected stakeholders. If the committee
reaches consensus, it reports to the agency which then utilizes the committee's decision as the basis for a proposed rule. This procedure has been available since the
mid 1980s. See Seidenfeld, supra note 323, at 446-59.
327 See Freeman, supra note 316, at 55-65. Established by the EPA, Projects XL is
intended to allow regulated facilities the flexibility to develop alternatives to existing
regulatory requirements in order to produce greater environmental benefits at lower
costs. See Seidenfeld, supra note 323, at 466-85. The process basically entails the
regulated facility submitting a proposal to the EPA that identifies possible tradeoffs
on pollutants and media on a facility-wide basis. The EPA then negotiates a final
proposal with the applicant. As part of the final proposal, the applicant identifies
those stakeholders that should be involved in the negotiations. The EPA can reject
the proposal on the basis of inadequate stakeholder participation. Under Project
XL the mechanism for monitoring compliance with the proposed plan is specified in
the final agreement itself. Some plans rely heavily on self-reporting of compliance
(the companies prepare reports on compliance and make them available to the public and the agency). Other plans specify more than mere reporting of performance,
and provide for additional meetings of stakeholders to evaluate the companies' performance. While participation in the plan relieves the company from fines for failure to meet the agreed standards, the EPA has the option of withdrawing from the
project, in which case the facility would have to meet all applicable regulatory standards. Id.
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group participation; (2) the capture problem; and (3) the continuity problem.
Adequate public participation refers to identifying the proper
groups that have a stake in the rule-making process and providing them with the access, resources, and expertise needed to
make a meaningful contribution to the regulatory process.3 28
Capture or cooption refers to the possibility that either the interest groups that are represented at the bargaining table will disregard the interest of other stakeholders that are not present, or
that the leadership of the groups at the bargaining table will compromise the interests of their membership in exchange for some
broader political gain. 329 Finally, the continuity problem arises
due to the turnover that occurs in the membership of the groups
participating in flexible regulation experiments.3 3 °
These problems are somewhat related. To see how they interact consider the following. Principles of fairness and openness
suggest as broad participation as possible in the process of enacting a new rule. All groups and individuals with a stake in the
regulatory issue should be able to participate in the process leading to the adoption of a new rule or standard. 33 1 Broader participation increases the availability of information and thus furthers
the goal of creative and innovative decision-making.3 3 2 Finally,
broader participation diminishes the chances of cooption or capture, as it prevents "sweetheart" deals by allowing all possible
interests to be represented at the bargaining table.3 3 3
Opening the door to every imaginable stakeholder, however,
raises in turn some practical problems. For example, broad participation will make the negotiation process too lengthy and thus
limit the efficiency gains of a flexible approach as compared to
traditional rulemaking. 33 4 Broad participation will also allow
fringe groups to highjack the process by introducing extreme
demands.3 35
Another problem relates to the likelihood that local groups
See Freeman, supra note 316, at 77-82.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 323, at 421-23.
Id. at 484-86.
See Freeman, supra note 316, at 77-82.
332 Id. at 27.
328
329
330
331

333 Id. at 30
334 See Seindenfeld, supra note 323, at 487-88.
335 Id.
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will dominate the negotiation process.33 6 On the one hand, this
tendency, if it materializes, is not a drawback on itself. Local
groups are likely to have better idiosyncratic knowledge, and a
greater sense of commitment to solving the problem. 337 On the
other hand, local groups are likely to have more extreme views,
and might lack the expertise to engage in meaningful negotiations with the opposing side and with the agency.3 38
The third problem, lack of continuity, presents another impediment in the use of flexible regulation. A key component of flexible regulation is the presumption that following the adoption of
the new rules or standards, there will not be any challenges to the
legitimacy of the adopted framework. 339 The parties that participated in the adoption process are expected to continue to be
committed to the framework they negotiated, and thus not to
challenge the framework's legitimacy. 340 However, fringe groups
that did not participate are likely to disrupt the process by challenging its legitimacy.34 1
It has been suggested that for flexible regulation to work (that
is, to adequately deal with the problems of group inclusion, cooption and continuity) three conditions have to be satisfied: (1)
stakeholders can be divided into discrete groups with clearly
identifiable regulatory interests; (2) stakeholders maintain an
ongoing relationship with the owner of the regulated facility; and
resources to prop(3) stakeholders have access to expertise and
34 2
erly negotiate with other interested groups.
Are these three conditions likely to materialize in the labor
relations area, were we to adopt a flexible regulation approach?
This section concludes by suggesting that all of these three conditions could be satisfied given the institutional dimensions of the
labor relations process.
First, unlike negotiated rulemaking, the rules-menu approach
will only be applicable to a particular firm. Accordingly, it is
very easy to identify the groups with a stake in the adoption of a
regulatory framework: the employer and the current employees.
336 Id. at 477-80 (noting the apparent lack of interest by national environmental
groups to participate in Project XL negotiations).
337
338

Id.

340

Id.

Id.
339 See Seidenfeld, supra note 323, at 477-80.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 439-44.
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Further, the presence of labor organizations substantially facilitates the implementation of flexible regulation. Local labor organizations are primarily responsive to the interests of the
members they represent. However, since they are affiliated with
a national organization, which in turn is most likely affiliated
with the AFL-CIO, extreme local interests are properly
constrained.
Second, labor organizations are also likely to provide some of
the continuity that has been lacking under negotiated rulemaking
and even under Project XL. The ongoing relationship, however,
raises concerns regarding cooption of group leaders. Overall,
however, concerns with cooption are maybe less likely in this
context. Although the labor movement in the United States has
experienced its share of scandals and dubious dealings, there is
very little doubt that unions are independent organizations, unlikely to be coopted by the employer.
Finally, the affiliation between local and national unions will
provide the locals with the necessary resources, expertise, and
information to properly negotiate with employers over the adoption of the regulatory framework.
Overall, the approach outlined here is amenable to the aim of
flexible regulation: empowering the groups and individuals that
are the subject of the regulatory regime. By allowing employers
and employees to, in effect, define the details of their rights and
obligations in regard to the labor relations process the rulesmenu approach will allow the parties to tailor the regulation to
the needs and idiosyncrasies of a particular industry and even a
particular firm. This flexibility could be accomplished without
compromising the protections currently afforded employees
under the various statutes. Employees will have the same voice
as the employer in choosing the appropriate set of rules that will
govern their employment rights.
CONCLUSION

The express package delivery industry provides us with a
unique research opportunity of exploring the impact that regulation has on the ability of firms to compete within a single industry. This Article takes advantage of that opportunity. By
comparing the three regulatory regimes regarding labor relations
in the express package delivery industry, the Article contributes
to our understanding of the competitive effects of regulation.
HeinOnline -- 80 Or. L. Rev. 1004 2001

A Tale of Three Statutes... (and One Industry)

1005

The Article analyzes the cost implications of having firms within
the same industry subject to different labor laws, and identifies
the inequities that result from the current frameworks applicable
to the express delivery industry.
The Article then turns this weakness into a possible strength
by outlining the contours of a new labor law regulatory framework in which firms and employees are allowed to choose the set
of labor regulations that will govern their relationship. In the
spirit of new experiments with flexible regulation, the framework
introduced here relies on the input provided by those that will be
affected by the regulatory scheme, to provide a more dynamic
and tailored regulatory environment.
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